



IRSTI 11.09.91
Scientific article

<https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-6887/2026-154-1-197-208>

Historical Prerequisites for the Formation of Kazakh-Chinese Physical Borders: A Source Analysis

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Abstract. Kazakhstan's historical development and geopolitical situation are closely intertwined with the Central Asian region and the influence of major neighboring powers, particularly China and Russia. This research focuses on the development of Kazakh-Chinese diplomatic relations beginning with the Dzungar Khanate, which led to the emergence of a physical border between the Kazakh Khanate and the Qing Dynasty. It also examines the growing political influence of the Qing court in Inner Asia, including the Qing Emperor's military campaigns against the Dzungars and invasions of Tibet. Furthermore, the emergence of imperial administrative units in the second half of the 18th century in Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and the eastern regions of Central Asia is examined. The paper also discusses and highlights diplomatic treaties between the Qing and Russian empires signed in the 18th and 19th centuries, which subsequently shaped Kazakhstan's modern borders. The formation of administrative units of Qing power in eastern Turkestan in the 18th century gave rise to mistrust of the legitimacy of the borders of modern states in the region, leading to diplomatic problems. By reviewing available surviving primary sources and historiographic narratives, this work explores the complexities of 18th-century border formation, the status of sovereignty in the eyes of empires, and the origins of Kazakh-Chinese relations. This work aims to minimize problems related to the legitimacy of borders between allied states. By analyzing historical events of the 18th and 19th centuries and their contemporary consequences, the research explores how past events connect to the region's current geopolitics, demonstrating that the legitimacy of a state's modern borders is determined by its history.

Keywords. Kazakh-Qing Relations, Geopolitics, Kazakh Khanate, Qing Empire, Central Asia, Dzungar Khanate, Imperial Expansion, Inner Asia, Russian Empire, Border Formation.

Received: 26.07.2025; Accepted: 25.02.2026; Available online: 30.03.2026

Introduction

Kazakhstan's historical and geographical position, its domestic and foreign policy, and the formation of its borders are tightly connected with the indigenous Central Asian states. They are also directly related to the history of the great powers of the region. Due to its geopolitical location, Central Asia is the cornerstone of Russian-Chinese relations in the diplomatic and economic spheres. Both oriental studies and state historiography look at this topic lightly and incompletely. Because of this, some politicians and historians of the giant countries surrounding us are suspicious of the traditions of greatness, sovereignty, and the formation of the country's borders. The reason for such views is the insufficient research on historiographic theories. On the one hand, the position of the great powers still dominates in the systematization of the history of the Eastern countries. Since the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991, the Sino-Kazakh relations have played a significant role in the geopolitics and economy of our country. Also, the geographical location of the countries contributes to political and economic ties. For example, China is promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, a China-centric economic project based on improving connectivity. Under the initiative, Kazakhstan, as the largest country in the Central Asian region, will become a key center of Chinese expansion within one of the two branches of the Belt and Road Initiative [1]. Therefore, it is essential to determine the terminus a quo of Sino-Kazakh relations. Also, to minimize the emergence of problems due to territorial issues, such as the claims of the Chinese side to the Ili River Valley on the territory of Kazakhstan, it is necessary to consider the period of emergence of the physical border between the states and the chronological change of the border. However, the main problem in determining the origin is the change in the borders of states in different periods of history, which has complicated the creation of an alliance between states. That is why there are enough points for domestic oriental studies and historiography. This research work answers some of the problems of decision-making in this direction.

Historically, Sino-Kazakh diplomatic relations began with the emergence of a shared physical border between Qing China and the Kazakh Khanate in the first half of the 18th century due to the disappearance of the buffer state of the Dzungar Confederation. However, as the historical hegemon in the region, China has written records about Central Asia since the Han dynasty around the 2nd century BC. Bakhyt Ezhengan-Uli presented the lines of Shiji or Records of the Grand Historian written by Sima Qian as the first Chinese record about Central Asians, which illustrates the Chinese belief during the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) [2]:

“Some time ago, Emperor Wudi (156-87 BCE) of the Han Dynasty predicted from the Book of Changes and was told that ‘divine horses would appear from the northwest.’ Therefore, he changed the name of the Wusun horses to ‘horses from the western end’ and used the name ‘heavenly horses’ for the Dayuan horses [2].”

Research methods

The article employs the methods of historical science, including documentary research, documentary analysis, comparison, theoretical analysis, and historical and geographical research. Data and research are interconnected. Historical sequence, complex taxonomy, and comparative typological techniques are used as a guide.

The formation of the modern state border between Kazakhstan and China is rooted in a complex history of regional geopolitics, diplomatic negotiations, and historical documents that date back centuries. This topic, viewed through the lens of oriental studies, reveals the intricate processes that contributed to the current territorial configuration and sheds light on the evolving nature of Kazakh-Chinese relations.

Results and discussions

Kazakhstan's strategic position at the crossroads of Central Asia has historically rendered it a focal point for diverse cultures, empires, and political interests. The territory of present-day Kazakhstan was shaped by its integration into major political entities, including the Turkic Khaganates, the Mongol Empire, and subsequently the Qing and Russian Empires. In the post-Soviet era, the demarcation of Kazakhstan's borders with China necessitated a thorough reassessment of these historical legacies, as well as the legal and diplomatic documents inherited from previous periods.

Borders are a significant issue not only historically but also in current international relations. Both Oriental studies and state historiography treat this topic lightly and incompletely. Because of this, some politicians and historians of the giant countries surrounding us are suspicious of the traditions of greatness, sovereignty, and the formation of the borders of our country. The reason for such views is the insufficient research into historiographic theories. On the one hand, the position of the great powers still dominates in the systematization of the history of the Eastern countries. This research aims to fill these gaps by providing a critical, source-based analysis rooted in oriental studies and by fostering a more nuanced, balanced understanding of how Kazakhstan's borders were historically formed.

According to the original documents of the Han Dynasty, the people of Dayun were the inhabitants of the Central Asian regions. Confirmation of Ezhenhan-Uli's words will be the work of Barinov [3], who stated that the first Chinese written records about the inhabitants of the Central Asian region of present-day Kazakhstan date back to 138 and 115 BC [3].

Subsequently, data about diplomatic relations between Tang China and the Turkish Khaganate came to light in the Chinese imperial archives. However, since the Kazakh Khanate emerged in the territories of Desht-i Kipchak, information about the Kazakhs appeared in Chinese chronicles only during the Qing dynasty. From the end of the 17th century until the 1710s, information about the Kazakhs periodically appeared in the records of the Qing court. In 1696, in December of the 35th year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi, after the defeat of the army of Galdan, Khan of the Dzungar Confederation, the great Qing Emperor was presented with a horse that was taken from the enemy forces [2]. Later, the emperor's words connect the expression "heavenly horse" and the Kazakhs. In the Strategy for Pacifying the Northern Desert, it is written as follows:

After the victory over the Dzungar Khan, the Khalkha-Mongol princes presented a horse to the emperor as a tribute. Later, when the emperor was riding a horse, he said to Zhang Yushu:

"What I am riding is a horse from the Kazakh state. The Dzungar ruler received a horse from the Kazakhs, and after defeating him, the horse was given to me as a gift. After riding it, I can say that its sweat is like blood. As a result, I concluded that this must be the "bloody sweating horse" of Dayuan, which was mentioned in ancient records" [2].

The analogy drawn between the Kazakh state and the ancient Dayuan appeared again in Chinese records in the 1710s. The analogy appeared on the map of Tulisen, an envoy of the Qing

Empire's estates to the Kalmyk state who traveled along the Volga River from 1712 to 1715. The Tulisen's Map was issued in two languages, "Ba Na yi Nirugan" in Manchu and "Yiyulu ditu" in Chinese. Tulisen in the map depicts the Kazakh state with a vast territory and refers to it in the Manchu version simply as "Hasak", but then he changes it to: "Kazakh was the same state of Dayuan" [2]. It can be concluded that the designation of the Kazakhs as Dayuan on Tulisen's map was a consequence of the analogy proposed by Kangxi, the Qing Emperor, in 1696.

However, contrary to the mention of the Kazakhs in imperial records, the first official diplomatic relations were established by Ablai Khan in 1757, when the Khan sent his ambassadors to the Qing Emperor asking for a friendly alliance. In a letter addressed to the Qing Emperor, Ablai Khan stated that since the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate, there had been no interaction between the Khanate and the Empire, and the alliance was not created due to the lack of common borders between the states [4]. As mentioned above and in the letter of Ablai Khan, it was only in 1757 that a physical border appeared between the Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanate as a result of the defeat and destruction of the Dzungar Confederation by the Qing Dynasty. The Dzungar Confederation was a buffer state and a natural border between the Kazakh Khanate and the Qing Empire since its emergence in 1644.

The Ming Dynasty controlled a much smaller territory compared to modern China. The Inner Asian territories of Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and neighboring areas, conquered by the Manchu Dynasty, were tributary states like Korea, Vietnam, and other states during the Ming Dynasty. Under the Ming rule, China was characterized by fifteen provinces and the Han people living there. This characterization was widespread among the Han elite by the early 15th century. In the earliest Manchu records, the Han people were referred to by the term nikan, and Ming China itself was referred to as nikan gurun (the state of Han) or as nikan i daiming i gurun (the state of the Great Ming Han) [5]. The early Manchu rulers also viewed China as equivalent to the Han group and the Ming Empire. After the emergence of the Manchu state, its rulers tried to demonstrate the political independence of Manchuria from Ming China. For example, in 1627, the second ruler of Manchuria, Hong Taiji, sent a delegation to discuss the border issue with the Ming court. The official letter stated that Shanhaiguan could serve as a legitimate border between the two states. In the official letter, Hong Taiji considered Manchuria an independent state from Nikan Gurun [5]. However, after the conquest of China, this attitude changed dramatically. However, the Qing Empire, led by the Manchu dynasty, was more oriented toward its internal Mongolian and external Central Asian possessions. It also viewed China as only one part of the entire Qing Empire. In this regard, the Manchu dynasty was similar to the Mongol Empire, in which China was part of a vast empire from 1276 to 1368 [6]. The Manchu dynasty presented themselves as the ideological heir to the great Mongol Empire, but this required that the Mongols, the true heirs of Genghis Khan's legacy, submit to Manchu rule and become the subject peoples of the Qing Empire. By the second half of the 17th century, this goal was achieved through diplomacy and military force. Because by this time, the Mongols were not united enough to pose an effective challenge to Manchu domination [6].

In historiographies, the Chinese empire has often been conceptualized as ruled by foreign rulers. However, because the founders of the dynasty came from different ethnic groups than their predecessors, the designation of the word China changed over time. Each time a non-Han group came to power, China became a mixture of "Han" and non-Han groups [5]. Notably, for non-Han dynasties, designating the country as China did not affect the ethnic identity of the non-Han groups. For example, the Qing and Yuan dynasties identified the inferior position of

the Han groups in the bureaucratic administrative system, but both dynasties referred to their states as China.

As mentioned above, the Manchu Dynasty rulers separated Manchuria from Ming China. However, after the Qing Dynasty gained power, the Manchu views changed: Qing and China became interchangeable and appeared as a substitute for the former in official documents. There were significant reasons for changing Qing in official documents. For example, accepting the concept of China publicly and the adoption of Han culture by a non-Han ruler would earn him the loyalty of the Han people [5]. Despite the changing political conditions during the reigns of the Manchu rulers, from the reign of Shunzhi to Qianlong, Qin and China denoted one state and were interchangeable in official documents. The first use of China to refer to the Qing Empire was in an edict issued by the Qing court in 1656. The edict resolved a territorial dispute between the Qing power and Mongolia: "Fanyi, which was subject to tribute by the Mongols during the Ming Dynasty, shall come under Mongolian rule. But the fanyi, who were under the rule of the Ming Dynasty, must accept the rule of China (Qing Empire)" [5].

The long-standing rivalry between the Khalkha, Oirats, and Chahars led to the growth of Manchu power in the northeast by the first decades of the seventeenth century. However, the fragmentation of the Mongol ethnic groups that contributed to the rise of Manchu power after the Qing Dynasty prevented all Mongol groups from subordinating themselves to the center of power. A military campaign against the Chahar leader, Lindan Khan, in the 1630s, opened the way for the second Manchu ruler, Hong Taiji, to assume political leadership in the Mongol world. Hong Taiji's leadership was subsequently symbolically expressed in his appropriation of the "jade seal" of Genghis Khan [7].

In the first half of the seventeenth century, in parallel with the strengthening of the Manchus, the Oirats defeated the head of the Khalkha confederation, Soloi Ubasi Hong Taiji, in 1623, thereby gaining the upper hand in the long-standing rivalry between the Oirats and the Khalkhas [7]. After gaining political leadership in the Mongolian world, the leader of the Manchus, Hong Taiji, created the Eight Mongolian Banners in 1632, which recruited troops from the tribes of "inner Mongolia". During the reign of Galdan Bosogtu Khan from the early 1660s to the late 1670s, the Dzungars grew stronger, and further strengthening of the Dzungars would have called into question the political leadership of the Manchus in the Mongolian world, so Emperor Kangxi of the Manchu dynasty stepped up his political and diplomatic activities [8].

The first open confrontation between the Manchu and Dzungar military contingents occurred in 1688 when Galdan attacked Khalkha, and the Kangxi Emperor came to the aid of Khalkha to stabilize the Mongol peace. From 1688 to 1696, intense political and diplomatic activity continued among the Mongol tribes, Manchus, and Tibetans [7]. The political rivalry between the Dzungars and Manchus affected Tibet because of the Kangxi Emperor's fear that Galdan would gain an ally in the Tibetan regent. An alliance between the Tibetan regent and the Dzungars could distance the Tibetans from the Manchus, and also the Dalai Lama could politically legitimize Galdan's leading position among the Mongols [9]. In addition, the Manchus needed to break the political ties between the Mongol aristocracy and the theocratic elite of Tibet, established in the sixteenth century, to stabilize their power in Inner Asia. Also, the ineffectiveness and indecisiveness of the Manchu power in the fight against the Dzungars would have called into question the political leadership of the Manchus over the Khalkha and Chahar Mongols. Also, an alliance between the Mongol aristocracy and the Lamaist hierarchy could

have created the basis for the emergence of a rival power center [9]. As a result, the Kangxi Emperor acted decisively against the Dzungars in the political and diplomatic arena.

The Russian invasion of the Amur and the "Three Feudatories Rebellion" required decisive action to preserve the integrity of the state and ensure the loyalty of the dynasty's allies: this pushed the Qing to a full-scale territorial expansion to the west and northwest of the country. As a result of the military Albazin conflict in 1689, the first peace border treaty of Nerchinsk was signed between the Russian Tsardom and the Qing Empire [10]. In the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, a large number of points were put forward between the countries, but summarizing the information, the treaty can be summarized in three points:

- The treaty specified the location of the rivers flowing on the other side of the mountains that should remain under Russian control.
- According to the treaty, the Ud River was defined as being "in the possessions of the Russian state."
- The mountain range lying near the Amur, serving as a natural border between the two states, was defined as "in the possessions of the Chinese state [11]."

The peace treaty established the border along the Argun and Gorbitsa rivers, then along the Stanovoy Range to the Uda River [8]. However, in 1727, when the Treaty of Kyakhta was signed, it duplicated the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, but it was more broadly considered a trade agreement between states [12]. The Treaty illustrated that the Russians considered their contacts with China primarily as a commercial enterprise. However, the Manchu government considered the treaty as the first step in establishing the traditional system of tribute over the Russian state, by which China controlled the peoples on its intra-Asian borders. Thus, the relationship between the two neighboring states from the earliest stages was overshadowed by contradictions. Also, in these differences, the cornerstone of mutual misunderstanding was the difference in the thinking models of the East and West, which grew out of Confucianism and Christianity [12]. Furthermore, the Manchus focused on completing the campaign to suppress the rebellious Three Feudatories until the 1680s, which subsequently allowed the Kangxi Emperor to strengthen his influence over China. But at the same time, the Manchus paid little attention to the northwest, and this opportunity was taken advantage of by the Dzungars, who organized a series of attacks on Qing territory in northern Mongolia [6].

The anti-Dzungar military campaigns led to the above-mentioned eight-year confrontation between the Kangxi Emperor and Galdan Boshogtu Khan from 1688 to 1696. Galdan Boshogtu Khan had been a yellow-capped lama in Tibet in his youth, as a result of which he retained close ties with the religious elite of Tibet, and in 1677 the fifth Dalai Lama himself granted him the title of khan [6]. During their military campaigns, the Manchus realized that they needed to tighten their grip on Tibet politically because of the Dalai Lama's influence in Mongolia and Dzungaria. Control of Tibet was therefore key to imperial expansion to the north and northwest.

As a result of the defeats of Galdan-Boshogtu in 1696, the Qing dynasty imposed restrictions on the Dalai Lama's political power. Emperor Kangxi obliged the Tibetan Yellow Hat sect and the Dalai Lama that the theocratic power of the Lamaists should be directly linked to the Qing Dynasty. Control of Tibet became integral to the Manchu campaign to destroy the Dzungars. An opportunity arose for the Qing Dynasty in 1717 when the Dzungars invaded Tibet over a complex dispute over the succession to the Dalai Lama. The Qing, in turn, expelled the Dzungars in 1720, ostensibly to support the "true" new Dalai Lama, but in reality, to consolidate their

control over Tibet. In 1720, Emperor Kangxi stationed a garrison in Lhasa to maintain the established authority over Tibet [6]. The Qing Dynasty now dominated Tibet, and this became a major factor in the expansion of Qing imperial control into Inner and Central Asia.

However, in 1723, Emperor Yongzheng acceded to the throne and recalled part of the garrison stationed in Lhasa. After suppressing the uprising of Lobjang Danjin's rebellion in Kokonor in 1723, the emperor left the previously appointed troops to exclude cases of mass rebellion [6]. In 1727, the Manchus separated Kokonor and eastern Kham from Tibet to minimize the possibility of mass uprisings against the emperor's rule. Kokonor was placed under Lifan Yuan, and the eastern Kham was included in Sichuan Province [6]. Also, fearing inter-confessional strife between different lamaist sects supported by various Mongol tribes, Emperor Yongzheng created an imperial political and military superstructure in Tibet. Through the creation of a superstructure, the Qing Dynasty attempted to promote centralization under the auspices of a local monarchy. Subsequently, in 1750, the system was transformed into a semi-theocratic government under the leadership of the Dalai Lama [7].

The Qing system of administrative rule was introduced in Tibet in 1727 [6]. Two imperial officials from the Manchus arrived in Tibet: the Senior Imperial Resident and the Junior Imperial Resident. The two imperial officials in Tibet were mostly called ambans. The imperial resident was chosen from the high-ranking banner men and was under the command of Lifan Yuan. The imperial officials also had about two thousand soldiers under their command. After the establishment of a semi-theocratic state in 1750, the powers of the Ambans were expanded [7]. During the Gurkha War from 1788 to 1792, the powers of the Ambans were further expanded and were equal in political authority to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. All administrative power was concentrated in the hands of the imperial residents: approval of appointments to the government, including ministerial positions. In addition, all promotions, demotions, and punishments. The Ambans controlled the revenue system, criminal justice, foreign affairs, and correspondence with the Supreme Court. As a consequence of the expansion of powers in the early 1790s, the troops under the Ambans were increased to three thousand men.

The Manchus began their expansion into Outer Mongolia by subjugating 550 Khalkha princes under the Treaty of Dolonnor in 1691. Due to the extreme vastness of the territories, coupled with the decentralized political organization of the Mongols in tribes and the willingness of the Manchus to maintain the political structure of the Mongols to provide military manpower, the Qing Dynasty did not plan a full-scale military occupation of Mongolia. Instead, the Qing government granted self-government to the "colonies" but only within the framework of the "imperial" administrative and judicial structure [7]. Khalkha, Mongolia, came under the rule of the Manchu Dynasty in 1691, and after the Manchu rule, it was divided into two stages:

- Between 1691 and 1724, the decentralization of local Mongolian elites under the Manchus occurred to undermine their political and religious leaders.
- Also, from 1725 to 1762, the centralization of political power was in the hands of the Qing administration [7].

In Outer Mongolia, there were three high-ranking Qing officials. The first official of the three was the military governor of Uliasutai, who also held the title of lieutenant military governor for pacifying the border. Created in 1733, this position was one of the first in the outer territories. The military governor mobilized troops from Outer Mongolia to suppress local and mass uprisings. The second official, the Mongolian assistant resident, was responsible for maintaining

order, regulating the growing trade with Russia through Kyakhta, and also, in parallel, trying to limit the influence of the head of the Buddhist church in Mongolia. The third-highest official was the imperial assistant resident in Kobdo. Kobdo acquired its political status only in 1762 to strengthen the influence of the Qing dynasty in the territory conquered from the Dzungars [7].

Territorial clashes with Russia and the remnants of the Ming generals contributed to the beginning of the large-scale expansion of Qing China into Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Dzungaria in the last decade of the 17th century. As mentioned above, Outer Mongolia fell under the rule of the Qing administration in 1691, Tibet finally in 1727, and Qing China fought with Dzungaria from 1688 to 1757. The Qianlong Emperor took advantage of the disagreements between the Dzungars to put an end to the Sino-Dzungar wars began to mobilize armed forces in 1755 and defeated the troops of Amursana, the ruler of all Dzungaria, in 1756 [13]. In 1757, the remnants of the Dzungar army, led by Khoja Jihan and his companions, fell apart after the execution of Khoja Jihan by the ruler of Badakhshan, Sultan Shah. After the fall of Altysnar and the buffer state of the Dzungar confederation, Qing China acquired physical borders with Central Asia [13].

The defeat of the Dzungars by Qing China marked the final defeat of the nomadic world by the sedentary agricultural powers. Following the defeats, the Dzungar state was erased from the historical scene, and the population was decimated by a combination of famine, epidemic diseases, Chinese massacres, and enslavement by Chinese, Kazakh, Russian, and other states. As a result, the Chinese imperial government gained the most extensive territory in the history of dynastic China. In the 1760s, the territory of Qing China included the present-day borders of the People's Republic, the territory of what is now the Mongolian Republic, part of Kyrgyzstan, the Ili River valley in Kazakhstan, and parts of Siberia north of the Amur River under the peace treaty concluded with Russia in 1689. The Qing retained nominal control and de facto sovereignty over the Ili River valley, part of Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Siberia north of the Amur River until 1870, but then came under the domination of the Russian Empire [14]. But, in 1881, the St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, under which about 80% of the Ili region was returned to the Qing Empire for significant compensation. However, about 23 thousand square kilometers of the Ili region remained with the Russian Empire. In Kazakhstan, this territory occupies several districts in the Almaty region: most of the Uyghur, Raimbek, and Panfilov districts [14]. The Central Asian region, having lost its independent status, began to turn into border areas of the Qing and Russian empires: the eastern part of Central Asia, east of the Pamir Mountains, was included in the Qing Empire, and its western part in the Russian Empire [14].

On the once-powerful Dzungar Khanate territories and the territories of its vassal oases of Altysnar, the Qing Dynasty formed a new administrative-territorial region of Xinjiang, from the Chinese "New Border" [15]. In the Turkic-Muslim society, it is better known as Little Bukhara and East Turkestan. In Xinjiang, to the north of the Tien Shan, the Dzungar steppe connects the Mongolian plateau with the endless steppe. The Altai Mountains form a natural border in the north and northeast. The corridor formed by the mighty mountains leads to the Gobi Desert in the east. The Tarbagatai and Dzungar Alatau mountain ranges go to the east and west, leaving an open passage to the Kazakh steppe. In the center, the Turpan desert plain, but in its north and south, it is surrounded by a dense ring of pastures.

Furthermore, Xinjiang under the Qing, similar to Outer Mongolia, was divided into three regions under the general leadership of a military governor: northern Xinjiang, the Ili Valley in Ningyuan, and military commanders in the major urban centers to the east and south. The

nomads were organized into jasaks modeled on the Qing imperial "banners." All regional power was in the hands of Dutong, based in Urumqi. However, the actual civil administration consisted of bek (local Muslim officials and civil officials from local tribes) [13]. The territory of Xinjiang, formed by the Qing government in 1760, shows why China and the Kazakh Khanate did not have diplomatic relations. The Dzungar Confederation was a vast state that was a natural barrier to diplomatic relations between states that previously did not have stable relations. The reign of the Qing dynasty in historical chronology dates back to 1644 [16], but the Manchus completely conquered China by the 1680s. A large-scale expansion directed to the north and northwest began only in the 1690s, and the Qing dynasty conquered the Dzungar Confederation entirely in 1757. After the fall of the Dzungar Confederation, the Qing authorities received the communal territories, and subsequently, a physical border appeared between Qing China and the Kazakh Khanate.

Conclusion

The historical and geographical position of Kazakhstan, its domestic and foreign policy, and the history of its borders are closely connected with the indigenous Central Asian states and directly related to the history of the region's great powers, particularly China and Russia. The Qing policies of establishing tributary relations and a system of indirect rule that granted considerable autonomy to local elites contributed to stabilizing the border regions and to the final formation of the borders in Inner Asia, which subsequently influenced later agreements by other states. Also, the prolonged expansion of the Qing dynasty into Central Asia from the second half of the 17th century to the second half of the 18th century, in particular its conquest of the Dzungar Khanate, dramatically changed the political landscape. Having eliminated the Dzungar threat, the Qing established control over vast territories, which led to direct interaction with the Kazakh Khanate, as a result of which the physical border between the states appeared in the Ili River valley. Identifying the first historical border between the states and tracing the changes in the border by historical events further eliminates the emergence of territorial issues. Since Kazakhstan gained independence, China has been laying claim to territories distant from Qing China in 1881 as a result of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, which is now part of the territory of Kazakhstan. However, as was said earlier, the territory was included in Semirechye in 1871, and in 1881, a peace treaty was signed between the empires, where all points were agreed upon, which eliminated historical disputes and ambiguities of territories. Understanding the long history of diplomatic, military, and economic relations between China and Kazakhstan is essential for assessing modern geopolitics. Tracing these historical roots, it is possible to exclude territorial claims and disputes, which contribute to forming political alliances and partnerships between China and Kazakhstan in the 21st century. For example, China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative continues the historical pattern of interconnectedness and economic interaction, in which Kazakhstan plays a key role.

Contribution of the authors:

Abdipatta Z.N. – provided guidance for the study, determined the research direction, and searched for the necessary materials.

Kaiyrken T.Z. – prepared the manuscript and was responsible for its technical formatting.

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Қазақ-Қытай ортақ физикалық шекарасы қалыптасу тарихының алғышарттары: дереккөздік талдау

Аңдатпа. Қазақстанның тарихи-географиялық жайғасымы, байырғы Орта Азия мемлекеттерімен біртұтас жатқаннан бері, тарихтан ішкі-сыртқы саясаты және шекараларының қалыптасуы ірі державалар тарихымен тікелей байланысты. Бұл зерттеу Қазақ-Қытай қарым-

қатынастарының дамуын зерттей отырып, бастама ретінде XVIII ғасырдың бірінші жартысында Жоңғар хандығының жойылу нәтижесінде Цин патшалығы мен Қазақ хандығының арасына ортақ шекара пайда болуын негізге алады. Зерттеу сонымен қатар Цин империясының Ішкі Азиядағы геосаяси стратегияларын, оның ішінде жоңғарларға қарсы жорықтарын, Тибетке әскери шабуылдарын және моңғол тайпаларына үстемдік орнатуға бағытталған әскери-дипломатиялық әрекеттерді қарастырады. Сондай-ақ XVIII ғасырдың екінші жартысында Ішкі және Сыртқы Моңғолияда, Тибетте және Орталық Азияда империялық әкімшілік бірліктердің пайда болуын қарастырады. Бұған қоса, Цин әулетінің Орталық Азиядағы әрекеттері қазіргі аумақтық бөліністерге және тікелей геосаяси ландшафтқа қатысты бірнеше тарихи қате түсініктерді қалыптасуына алып келді. Әскери жорықтар, әкімшілік бақылау және дипломатиялық келісімдер арқылы Цин және Ресей империялары Қазақстанның шекарасын бекітуде шешуші рөл атқарды. Бастапқы дереккөздер мен тарихнамалық тәсілдерді талдай отырып, бұл зерттеу Қазақстан-Қытай қарым-қатынастарындағы шекараның қалыптасуының, егемендіктің және тарихи жазбалардың күрделілігін ашып, сол арқылы Орталық Азияның геосаяси динамикасын кеңірек түсінуге және одақтас елдер арасындағы аумақтық даулардың нәтижесінде туындаған мәселелерді барынша азайтуға ықпал етеді. Сонымен қатар зерттеу империялық саясаттың XVIII ғасырмен шектелмей қазіргі таңда да мемлекеттік деңгейде резонанс тудыратын ұзақ мерзімді сенімсіздік пен қайшылықтардың мұрасын қалай тудырғанын көрсетеді. Тарихи үдерістерге және олардың қазіргі заманғы салдарына баса назар аудара отырып, зерттеу өткенге ғана емес, сонымен қатар Еуразиядағы шекаралық саясаттың тұрақты өзектілігіне түсінік бере отырып, тарихи зерттеулер мен қазіргі қалыптасқан геосаяси түсінік арасындағы алшақтықты азайтуды мақсат етеді.

Түйін сөздер: Қазақ-Цин қатынастары, геосаясат, Қазақ хандығы, Цин империясы, Орталық Азия, Жоңғар хандығы, империялық экспансия, Ішкі Азия, Ресей империясы, шекаралардың қалыптасуы.

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Исторические предпосылки формирования казахско-китайских физических границ: источниковедческий анализ

Аннотация. Историческое развитие и геополитическое положение Казахстана тесно переплетены с регионом Центральной Азии и влиянием крупных соседних держав, в частности Китая и России. В этом исследовании рассматривается эволюция китайско-казахских отношений, прослеживая их истоки в первой половине XVIII века после падения Джунгарского ханства, которое установило прямую границу между династией Цин и Казахским ханством. В исследовании также рассматриваются геополитические стратегии империи Цин во Внутренней Азии, включая ее походы против джунгар, военные вторжения в Тибет и дипломатические усилия по утверждению господства над монгольскими группами. В нем также рассматривается возникновение имперских административных единиц во Внутренней и Внешней Монголии, Тибете и Центральной Азии во второй половине XVIII века. Усиление политической власти и действия цинского двора в Центральной Азии изменили геополитику региона, а также привели к возникновению исторических заблуждений относительно легитимности границ. Благодаря военным кампаниям, административному контролю и дипломатическим договорам, империя Цин и Российская империя сыграли решающую роль в определении границ Казахстана, оказав влияние на геополитическую структуру региона. Анализируя первоисточники и историографические подходы, данное исследование выявляет сложности формирования границ, суверенитета и исторических нарративов в казахско-китайских отношениях, тем самым способствуя более широкому пониманию геополитической динамики Центральной

Азии и минимизируя возникновение проблем, вызванных территориальными спорами между союзными странами. Кроме того, исследование подчеркивает, как имперская политика породила долгосрочное наследие недоверия и противоречий, которое выходит за рамки XVIII века и продолжает находить отклик в современном государственном управлении. Подчеркивая как исторические процессы, так и их современные последствия, исследование стремится преодолеть разрыв между историческим исследованием и современным геополитическим анализом, предлагая понимание не только прошлого, но и непреходящей актуальности пограничной политики в Евразии.

Ключевые слова: казахско-цинские отношения, геополитика, Казахское ханство, Империя Цин, Центральная Азия, Джунгарское ханство, имперская экспансия, Внутренняя Азия, Российская империя, формирование границ.

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