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Pride and prejudice: how trust in institutions may affect nation-building processes in Kazakhstan

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Abstract. For decades, Kazakhstan has been in search of a national idea that will unite its citizens regardless of their ethnic, religious, and regional origins. A number of programs were introduced to enhance the sense of shared history and belonging to our country; some of them were more successful, some – less. However, there is a clearly overlooked factor that may affect the sense of belonging to a state, whether a citizen feels comfortable and cared for by it.

In my article, I want to explore how trust in public institutions may affect the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. For this aim, I employed the dataset of the World Values Survey for Kazakhstan (7th wave). The results show a positive and statistically significant association between the trust in police, government, and courts, on one side, and the pride in Kazakhstan, and the sense of belonging to a local place of residence, on the other side. The findings also demonstrate that there is a statistically significant negative association between feeling close to a place of residence and the propensity to protest.

Keywords: nation-building, national identity, national idea, trust in public institutions, protests, collective action

Introduction

As for any relatively new state, for Kazakhstan, the issues of nation-building are of great importance, and the discussion in the scholarly field is still ongoing. There is clearly no consensus on what type of nation is being built in Kazakhstan. Scholars classified two types of nation models that are frequently discussed: ethno-centered Kazakh-based and civic Kazakhstani nations [1, 2, 3, 4]. The dichotomy itself is not unique for Kazakhstan [3], but the necessity for maneuvering between the two types of nationalisms has been crucial to preserving the statehood itself. At the dawn of independence, Kazakhs constituted a minority of citizens [5] and serious efforts have been taken to keep inter-ethnic peace and harmony. One of such ways was to focus on a civic nation inclusive of more than 130 ethnic groups of Kazakhstan. This argument is supported by the language policies and by the introduction of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan and even by its renaming into the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan [2].

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On the other hand, Kazakhs were many times stated as a state-forming ethnic group around which all others are gathering. The basics for such conclusions about the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan are a number of conceptual documents, such as the Conception of formation of state identity (May 1996), Doctrine of national unity (2009), the Conception of the strengthening and developing Kazakhstani identity and unity (2015), Rukhani Zhanghyru program, etc. Their main role is to develop ideas that have a consolidating potential: ideas of shared past, shared vision of the future, shared values [2, 6]. In this regard, the consolidating power of the Kazakhstani strategic documents is frequently overlooked. Though they are focused mainly on the state capacity building also have a significant part in shaping the vision of the future, and the state principles. For example, one such document is the Plan of the Nation – 100 concrete steps (2015), which sets the fundamentals for institutionalizing our state and interpersonal relations. Equality of opportunities, justice, and supremacy of the law may, in fact, be influential for Kazakhstani citizens to feel more “at home”, belong to the nation.

Sabina Insebayeva proposes a more comprehensive and extensive view on the competing discourses on the issue of nation-building and national identity formation [7]. According to her, for decades, contention has been happening between the pan-Islamist, ethnic nationalist, and republican nationalist ideas of nationalism in Kazakhstan. Apart from these large groups, Insebayeva mentions the existence of two small, but in a certain way influential groups that are also adding to the national identity negotiations: a group backing Slavist discourse (Russian language as a second state language, protecting Russian culture, etc.) and a group of liberals who stand for basing *a civic nation on the principles of democracy*. The latter view on the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan is the most intriguing for me, as long as the support base for it seems to grow over time.

The demand for a more just state that would treat all the citizens on the principles of equity and supremacy of law is becoming evident. Sharipova [4] provides the results of the survey according to which a crucial element of Kazakhstani identity, along with holding citizenship of Kazakhstan (96%), being patriotic (94%), knowing its history and language (93%), is to “respect the law and political institutions” (93%). Kurmanov and Knox [8] claim that the introduction of the “Listening state” principle has also led to citizens’ empowerment because they felt heard and that their needs and demands are taken into account. This, in turn, leads to higher levels of trust in the government and state bodies: “...greater access to information via open government should improve government transparency, enable more effective citizen participation, empower the public, and build trust between the state and citizens” [8]. Simultaneously, there are high level of critique in regard to such public institutions as law enforcement bodies and courts. The perception of them as highly corrupted and unjust led to the civil society consolidation around the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to make it more human-centered, which, however, failed to be implemented in full [9,10].

Taking into account the above-mentioned studies, I got interested in how trust in state institutions in Kazakhstan is associated with “patriotic” senses. If people believe that police protect their rights, will they be prouder of their country? If people trust their government and believe that it’s doing everything for their well-being, will they be more attached to their place of living?

Trust in public institutions and nationalism. The existing literature on political trust shows that the stronger is national identity, the more cohesive and trustworthy the society [11, 12, 13], which assumes that countries where the population has higher levels of national identity are more likely to trust each other and, thus, build trustworthy institutions. Putnam [14] claimed at least in the short run and at least in the American context, ethnic diversity negatively affects social solidarity and social capital (trust between people) in communities. Reeskens & Wright [15], however, bring examples of British and Dutch studies that provide mixed results on the influence of ethnic diversity on social cohesion, and cross-national studies that have limited evidence to this. Reeskens and Wright's own findings show that it's not the ethnic diversity that erodes social capital, but the type of nationalism that is prevalent in societies. Their study shows that ethnic-centered nationalism is associated with lower levels of social capital.

The potential to overcome this lies in the constitutional and even civic patriotism that is based on the respect to the civic procedures and laws [16, 17]. "To love one's own country meant for republican writers [...] to love the republic; that is, common liberty and the laws, and the civil and political equality that makes it possible. [17]. According to Ferry [18], one of the scholarly followers of Habermas, social connections between co-citizens should rather be based not on the geographical, cultural, or historical grounds, but on the legal, political, and moral. This is especially significant in multinational states where inclusivity and equality between ethnic groups are essential for ethnic minorities to feel like at home. Wimmer [19], on the basis of a cross-national sample with 165,000 respondents, argues that feeling of belonging and pride in a country lies in the plane of political representation. The groups that feel that their presence is noted and their needs and interests are met tend to have more national pride, while those lacking their representation have less pride. In his work, he also pays attention to how trust in the stability and that the status quo remains unchanged affects the feeling of pride of different ethnic groups. Trust in state institutions, feeling of being represented and powerful are closely connected, influencing each other and providing people with the feeling of safety and meaningfulness. "Citizens will not embrace the idea of the nation as a community of trust and solidarity if it is not accompanied by beneficial exchange relationships with the state." [19]

Chung and Choe [20] discuss the interplay between patriotism, national identity and national pride, considering that national pride is a component of national identity that frequently leads to or strengthens the national identity through creating and sustaining positive feelings to a country or a territory. The source of such feelings is usually achievements in sport, science, culture [20]. However, there is also a variation in what people feel proud of: for example, women tend to be prouder of the nation's arts and literature than men; older people are prouder of achievements in science, technology, literature, and the economy than younger people. We see that what people can be proud of is varying a lot, and may include many different things.

Intriguingly, though there is an abundance of articles and books on nation-building in Kazakhstan, a few of them are focused on exploring the connection between trust to state institutions and nation-building. At the same time, empirical research in different contexts shows that confidence in government and satisfaction with the democracy influence the sense of national pride [21, 22].

Theoretical framework and hypotheses. With this premise in mind, I posit first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. A higher level of confidence in the state institutions is associated with a higher level of pride for Kazakhstan and a higher sense of belonging to the place of residence.

My second hypothesis does not answer the main research question, but rather is an assumption of the association between nation-building processes and protesting as a form of political participation. I base it mainly on the idea of Henri Lefebvre on the “right to the city” [23, 24] that assumes that dwellers of a city have the right to appropriate the urban spaces and play a central role in its politics. In her empirical study, Richey [25] (2023) found that local patriotism affects people’s desire to improve their place of residence and, thus, they are more likely to participate in collective action. Based on the above-mentioned studies, I considered that people who are more closely connected to their places of residence will be more likely to try to improve them, including by participating in peaceful demonstrations.

Hypothesis 2. A higher sense of belonging to the place of residence is associated with a higher level of propensity to participate in protests.

Operationalization of the main concepts.

Trust in state institutions. Although there is a number of approaches to measure trust in state institutions, I am using the one that is available in the dataset – how much confidence people express in regard to certain institutions.

In WVS, the question sounds as follows: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 1. Police 2. Courts 3. Government”. The response range is the following: “A great deal”, “Quite a lot”, “Not very much”, “None at all”. The positive responses were added together as an indicator of trust, and were labeled as 1, and all others were labeled as 0.

Pride for Kazakhstan: “How proud are you to be of Kazakhstan’s nationality?”. The responses are the following: “Very proud”, “Quite proud”, “Not very proud”, “Not at all proud”. For our study, it is more informative to look at those who are absolutely proud of being Kazakhstani citizens, i.e., the most patriotic. Those who are “very proud” are labeled as 1, all others as 0.

Sense of belonging to Kazakhstan, and place of residence: “Would you tell me how close you feel to a village/town where you live?” The response range is the following: “Very close”, “Close”, “Not very close”,

“Not close at all”. Those who feel “very close” were labeled as 1, others as 0.

The formula to test hypothesis 1 was:

Pride/closeness to the place of residence = $\alpha + \beta * \text{trust_in (courts/police/government)} + \gamma_1 * \text{sex} + \gamma_2 * \text{married} + \gamma_3 * \text{urban/rural} + \gamma_4 * \text{education} + \gamma_5 * \text{ethnic} + \varepsilon$

Propensity to protest. In the World Values Survey, there are several types of collective action that people can participate in: boycotts, strikes, are radical ones, which are not in the focus of our interest. What is informative for us are peaceful demonstrations that may be aimed at drawing the attention of public bodies to a certain problem. However, as long as even participating in a peaceful demonstration may be considered dangerous, too few respondents actually participate in protests, and we don’t have the necessary level of variability of this outcome. This is why in this study we look at those who not only participated in peaceful demonstrations, but also could do so in certain conditions, i.e., have the *propensity to protest*.

In the WVS questionnaire, the question sounds as follows: “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: Attending peaceful demonstrations”. The response range is following: “Have done”, “Might do”, “Would never do”. We are more interested in those who have attended peaceful demonstrations and might attend them, so the first two responses were added together and labeled as 1, and others as 0.

The formula to test hypothesis 2 was:

$\text{Propensity_to_protest} = \alpha + \beta * \text{pride/closeness_to_local} + \gamma_1 * \text{sex} + \gamma_2 * \text{married} + \gamma_3 * \text{urban/rural} + \gamma_4 * \text{education} + \gamma_5 * \text{ethnic} + \varepsilon$

Table 1. The list of dependent and independent variables

Dependent variables	Independent variables	Control variables
Pride for being a Kazakhstani citizen (1 “very proud”, 0 “others”)	Confidence in police, courts, government (1 “A great deal + Quite a lot”, 0 “Others”)	Sex, type of location, ethnicity, education, marital status, income
Sense of belonging to a place of residence (1 “very close”, 0 “others”)	Confidence in police, courts, government (1 “A great deal + Quite a lot”, 0 “Others”)	
Propensity to protest (1 “Have done+Might do”, 0 “Others”)	Pride for being a Kazakhstani citizen (1 “very proud”, 0 “others”) Sense of belonging to Kazakhstan, place of residence (1 “very close”, 0 “others”)	

Materials and research methods

For my study, I used the 7th wave dataset of the World Values Survey for Kazakhstan. After the exclusion of the respondents who didn’t answer questions of our interest, the number of respondents was 1182.

Taking into account that the dependent variables are dichotomous, to test my hypotheses, I used logistic regression. Apart from the discussed independent and dependent variables, I used control variables that include sex, marriage status, type of location (urban/rural), income, and education (In the tables with the results of logistic regressions, male respondents, unmarried people, urban citizens, Kazakhs are reference categories in relation to which other groups in the category are considered. For example, in the table 3, we see that female respondents are 29% more likely to feeling close to their place of residence if they trust in courts than male respondents (though the difference is not statistically significant), rural respondents 95% more likely to feel close to their place of residence if they trust in courts than urban respondents (statistically significant difference), Russians are 31% less likely to feel close to their place of residence if they trust in courts than Kazakhs (statistically not significant difference).

Considering that many respondents in Kazakhstan were found in small villages, some observations cannot be absolutely independent, so I clustered standard errors at the primary sample unit level.

Table 2. Sample characteristics

Characteristics	N	Share
Type of location		
Urban	694	59%
Rural	488	41%
Ethnic group		
Kazakh	783	66%
Russian	254	22%
Other ethnic groups	145	12%
Sex		
Male	540	46%
Female	642	54%
Age		
16-24	110	9%
25-34	331	28%
35-44	261	22%
45-54	244	21%
55-64	161	14%
65+	75	6%
Language spoken at home		
Kazakh	635	53%
Russian	469	40%
Other	78	7%

Results and discussions

Tables 3-5 present the results of logistic regression on the association between the trust of citizens in state institutions and feelings of pride of being a Kazakhstani citizen and feeling close to the place of their residence. When interpreting the results of logistic regression, we need to look at odds ratio – the probability of some event – and p-value meaning whether the results are statistically significant or not. Odds ratio higher than 1 mean a positive relationship, while odds ratio between 0 and 1 mean a negative relationship.

In Table 3, we see that there is a statistically significant positive association between confidence in courts and feeling close to the place of residence and feeling proud of being a Kazakhstani citizen. That is people who express trust in courts are more probably to feel close to their place of residence, and more probably will feel pride for being a Kazakhstani citizen.

In Table 4, we see the same statistically significant positive association between trusting in police and a sense of belonging to Kazakhstan (pride and closeness to the place of their residence). In Table 5, we see the statistically significant positive association between trust in

government and pride in being a Kazakhstani citizen and closeness to the place of residence. Hypothesis 1 is supported.

Table 3. The results of logistic regression on the association between the confidence in courts and sense of belonging to a place of residence, pride for being a Kazakhstani citizen

	Feeling very close to the place of their residence			Feeling very proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan		
	Odds ratio	SE	p-value	Odds ratio	SE	p-value
Confidence in courts	1.604**	0.264	0.004	1.968**	0.365	0.000
Female	1.291	0.189	0.082	1.201	0.177	0.212
Married	1.006	0.134	0.963	1.005	0.147	0.972
Income (increasing)	1.037	0.039	0.340	1.034	0.043	0.414
Rural	1.950**	0.429	0.002	2.248**	0.545	0.001
Russian	0.692	0.147	0.083	0.491**	0.104	0.001
Other ethnic groups	1.181	0.312	0.528	0.778	0.196	0.319
Primary education (ISCED 1)	1			0.457	0.405	0.377
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2)	0.859	0.514	0.800	0.625	0.375	0.433
Upper secondary education (ISCED 3)	1.488	0.77	0.442	0.539	0.28	0.235
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4)	2.193	1.157	0.137	0.99	0.525	0.986
Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5)	1.619	0.848	0.358	0.792	0.417	0.658
Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6)	1.684	0.877	0.317	0.75	0.392	0.582
Master or equivalent (ISCED 7)	2.17	1.129	0.136	1.363	0.713	0.553
Cons.	0.270	0.115	0.002	0.520	0.314	0.279
	Number of obs 1174 Wald chi2(13) 37.17 Prob > chi2 0.0004 Pseudo R2 0.0446			Number of obs 1182 Wald chi2(13) 52.37 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0787		

Table 4. The results of logistic regression on the association between confidence in the police and sense of belonging to a place of residence, pride in being a Kazakhstani citizen

	Feeling very close to the place of their residence			Feeling very proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan		
	Odds ratio	SE	p-value	Odds ratio	SE	p-value
Confidence in courts	1.482**	0.248	0.019	2.211**	0.376	0.000
Female	1.279	0.186	0.093	1.188	0.174	0.237
Married	0.996	0.132	0.974	0.992	0.145	0.960

Income (increasing)	1.040	0.040	0.307	1.037	0.043	0.379
Rural	1.988**	0.440	0.002	2.228**	0.558	0.001
Russian	0.700	0.148	0.091	0.513**	0.108	0.001
Other ethnic groups	1.204	0.321	0.485	0.801	0.210	0.397
Primary education (ISCED 1)	1			0.467	0.413	0.389
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2)	0.99	0.589	0.987	0.72	0.432	0.584
Upper secondary education (ISCED 3)	1.644	0.848	0.335	0.585	0.305	0.303
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4)	2.373	1.249	0.101	1.036	0.55	0.947
Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5)	1.77	0.925	0.274	0.849	0.448	0.756
Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6)	1.84	0.956	0.239	0.785	0.411	0.644
Master or equivalent (ISCED 7)	2.4	1.244	0.091	1.485	0.778	0.450
Cons.	0.253	0.109	0.001	0.439	0.262	0.168
	Number of obs 1174 Wald chi2(13) 35.06 Prob > chi2 0.0008 Pseudo R2 0.0420			Number of obs 1182 Wald chi2(14) 56.57 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0846		

Table 5. The results of logistic regression on the association between confidence in the government and sense of belonging to a place of residence, pride in being a Kazakhstani citizen

	Feeling very close to the place of their residence			Feeling very proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan		
	Odds ratio	SE	p-value	Odds ratio	SE	p-value
Confidence in government	1.726**	0.301	0.002	2.547**	0.486	0.000
Female	1.303	0.192	0.072	1.224	0.182	0.174
Married	0.998	0.133	0.988	0.994	0.147	0.967
Income (increasing)	1.039	0.040	0.324	1.036	0.045	0.418
Rural	1.929**	0.426	0.003	2.189**	0.540	0.002
Russian	0.693	0.147	0.083	0.496**	0.105	0.001
Other ethnic groups	1.131	0.300	0.643	0.716	0.180	0.183
Primary education (ISCED 1)	1			0.454	0.404	0.375
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2)	0.982	0.588	0.975	0.72	0.439	0.590
Upper secondary education (ISCED 3)	1.56	0.812	0.392	0.54	0.287	0.246
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4)	2.3	1.22	0.116	0.992	0.537	0.989
Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5)	1.706	0.899	0.311	0.8	0.431	0.680
Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6)	1.784	0.933	0.269	0.757	0.404	0.602

Master or equivalent (ISCED 7)	2.262	1.183	0.118	1.356	0.725	0.569
Cons.	0.239	0.102	0.001	0.421	0.258	0.159
	Number of obs 1174 Wald chi2(13) 37.39 Prob > chi2 0.0004 Pseudo R2 0.0466			Number of obs 1182 Wald chi2(14) 69.72 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0907		

The results of logistic regression on the association between pride for being a Kazakhstani citizen and propensity to protest showed there is no association between the two variables. However, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between feeling close to the place of residence and propensity to protest. That is, those who feel very close to their village or town are less likely to participate in peaceful demonstrations. Hypothesis 2 is not supported.

Table 6. The results of logistic regression on the association between the sense of belonging to a place of residence and a propensity to participate in peaceful demonstrations

	Participated or might participate in peaceful demonstrations		
	Odds ratio	SE	p-value
Feel very close to the place of their residence	0.595**	0.125	0.013
Female	0.850	0.131	0.294
Married	0.743	0.130	0.089
Income (increasing)	0.875**	0.040	0.003
Rural	1.355	0.375	0.272
Russian	0.727	0.184	0.209
Other ethnic groups	0.620	0.202	0.142
Cons.	2.225	1.636	0.277
Number of obs 1174 Wald chi2(13) 48.77 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0485			

The results of our empirical study show that there is an association between trust in state institutions and feelings of national pride and feeling close to the place of residence. This may become a foundation for constructing nation-building based on constitutional or civic patriotism – when people are proud of their country and want to be a part of it because its institutions are inclusive and allow for representation. It can be essential for us, taking into account our positionality as a multinational state. As it was discussed in the introduction section, considering the globalizing world, high rates of migration, and varying levels of mortality and birth rates societies can no longer evolve around kinship-based social bonds, they cannot be based only on the shared history, geography, and culture. In order to keep up with the global processes, modern nations need to have some universal grounds for people's consolidation and nation-

building, and such are the beliefs and trust in state, its institutions and their stability. Following standards, official rules, and laws can be significant not just for people's psychological and social well-being but also to the sense of their political representation – being heard, their needs being taken into account – and through it feeling closer to their country and feeling proud of it. And this may consolidate the nation around this sense of inclusion.

The results of all regressions testing the association between trust in state institutions and the sense of pride and/or belonging to the place of residence look similar to each other, and it is probably because people who trust one state institution trust in all of them. Zhorayev [26] in his study found that in 38 countries of the world, confidence in police is associated with the general trust in the state institutions. This may mean that for future studies employing statistical analysis, it is possible to use the trust in only one institution as an indicator of general trust in institutions.

My assumption that the closer people feel to their place of residence the more they will be willing to protest, because they feel more right to it proved to be wrong. On the contrary, the higher sense of belonging to the place of residence is associated with the lower level of propensity to protest. One reason may be that people consider protests as a destructive means of political participation and, thus, are trying to prevent it from happening in the place they consider home. However, the additional examination showed that people with a higher sense of belonging to their place of residence have lower propensity to petition, too, though petitioning is much safer and less destructive way of political participation. It could also mean that people who feel close to their place of residence have this sense because they have less problems overall.

Limitations of the study

I need to point out that the results of logistic regression don't show the direction of the association between the two phenomena: trust in institutions and national pride and sense of belonging. Thus, it would be incorrect to claim that it is the trust in state institutions that increases the sense of pride and belonging, not vice versa.

The alternative explanation is that, as it was discussed in the introduction, there is a possibility that it's national pride that provides cohesive ties for people and this leads to higher mutual trust and societal institutions more. It is also possible that the sense of national pride makes people less perceptive to injustices and more trusting to the state institutions. I also supposed that the overall satisfaction with life could affect both pride and confidence in state institutions; however, logistic regression analysis didn't support this assumption. Still, there can be an unknown factor, or a factor that is difficult to operationalize and capture through surveys.

Another limitation of the study is that it employed the results of already conducted World values survey, and there was no chance to adapt the questions to our context. There was no possibility to expand the range of the questions and operationalize nation-building, national pride, sense of belonging in a more rigorous way.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of my study show that there is still a lot to study and explore about the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. We should not stop at discussing the dichotomy of ethnic-centered or civic nation; there are deeper things to discuss in each of these directions, too. Civic nation, for example, may be built on various bases, be it a national idea, national symbols,

or the promise to develop an inclusive society with the supremacy of laws. Civic nationalism based on republicanism, i.e., respecting and following civic procedures, can be more sustainable in the long run, providing people with the bonding ties, and social solidarity, apart from their kinship ties. This is especially crucial for such multicultural states as Kazakhstan.

There is a clear need for more in-depth, rich research to study the people's perceptions of what attracts them to Kazakhstan and what may, on the contrary, repulse them from it. It's obviously significant to pay attention to the national idea and national values that unite citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. The attractiveness of any country lies in the plane of the basic conditions it provides. Among such conditions can be not only economic ones, but as we see here, basic trust in state institutions.

It's also significant to pay deeper attention to studying what constitutes the national identity of Kazakhstani citizens. What role do shared history and collective memories play in the shaping of people's identities? How are these collective memories created and maintained and who are the main actors in this area?

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Мақтаныш пен алалаушылық: Қазақстандағы ұлт құру процестеріне институттарға артылған сенім қалай әсер етуі мүмкін

Аңдатпа. Ондаған жылдар бойы Қазақстан этникалық, діни және аймақтық шығу тегіне қарамастан Қазақстандықтарды біріктіретін өзінің ұлттық идеясын іздестіруде. Ортақ тарих пен өз еліне деген тиесілік сезімін арттыру үшін бірқатар бағдарламалар енгізілді, олардың кейбіреулері сәтті, ал кейбіреулері сәтсіз болды. Дегенмен, мемлекетке тиесілілік сезіміне әсер етуі мүмкін бірақ назардан тыс қалған бір фактор бар: азаматтың мемлекетте өзін жайлы және қамқорлықта болғанын сезуі.

Мен өз мақаламда мемлекеттік институттарға сенім Қазақстандағы ұлт құру процестеріне қалай әсер ететінін зерттегім келеді. Осы мақсатта мен Қазақстан үшін Әлемдік Құндылықтарды Зерттеу деректер жинағын (7-ші толқын) пайдаландым. Нәтижелер бір жағынан полицияға, үкіметке және соттарға деген сенім мен екінші жағынан Қазақстан үшін мақтаныш пен жергілікті тұрғылықты жерге тиесілі болу сезімі арасындағы позитивті және статистикалық маңызы бар байланысты көрсетеді. Нәтижелер сонымен қатар тұрғылықты жеріне жақын болу сезімі мен наразылық білдіруге бейімділік арасында статистикалық маңызы бар теріс байланыс бар екенін көрсетеді.

Түйін сөздер: ұлт құру, ұлттық бірегейлік, ұлттық идея, мемлекеттік институттарға деген сенім, наразылықтар, ұжымдық іс-қимыл.

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Гордость и предубеждение: как доверие институтам может влиять на процессы нациестроительства в Казахстане

Аннотация. На протяжении десятилетий Казахстан находится в поиске своей национальной идеи, которая объединит его граждан независимо от их этнического, религиозного и регионального происхождения. Был реализован ряд программ, направленных на усиление чувства общей истории и принадлежности к нашей стране, некоторые из них оказались более успешными, некоторые – менее. Однако есть явно упущенный из виду фактор, который может повлиять на чувство принадлежности к государству – чувствует ли гражданин себя комфортно и что государство о нем заботится.

В своей статье я хочу изучить, как доверие к государственным институтам может повлиять на процессы национального строительства в Казахстане. Для этой цели я использовала набор данных Всемирного исследования ценностей для Казахстана (7-я волна). Результаты показывают положительную и статистически значимую связь между доверием к полиции, правительству и судам, с одной стороны, и гордостью за Казахстан и чувством принадлежности к местному месту жительства, с другой стороны. Результаты также показывают, что существует статистически значимая отрицательная связь между ощущением близости к месту жительства и склонностью к протестам.

Ключевые слова: нациестроительство, национальная идентичность, национальная идея, доверие государственным институтам, протесты, коллективное действие

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