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**When economic sanctions are likely to be effective?**

**Abstract.** The insane outcomes of past wars and other conflicts took place in 20<sup>th</sup> century made states to think on creating a mechanism to prevent potential threats in the world that breach international peace and security. For these purposes, the imposition of economic sanctions is seemed to be the most formidable and applicable tool in the system of international relations. Until the present, economic sanctions are deployed unilaterally and multilaterally by states and international organizations against different regimes and episodes. However, a past experience showed that economic sanctions are not always effective in restraining possible conflicts and deterring actions of rogue states. Moreover, the efficacy of economic sanctions has become mostly debated subject of international studies. In this paper, we will analyze the works of scholars and researchers on the application of the economic sanctions and attempt to determine the concrete and effective ways of deploying sanctions. These applications of sanctions are listed and collected in the paper and we give our recommendations.

**Keywords:** economic sanctions, smart sanctions, international institutions, the United States of America, rogue states, unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

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**Introduction.** The peculiarity of economic and financial sanctions is that they affect the economic interests of both countries against which they are directed, as well as the initiators of sanctions, since they entail additional costs for their economies. Sanctions are often subject to harsh criticism from enterprises. The consequences of sanctions painfully affect the most vulnerable part of the population. In addition, economic sanctions cause fear, because armed conflicts are often anticipated. The effectiveness of sanctions is sometimes negligible compared with the costs and suffering associated with them. So, sanctions against Iraq have largely discredited economic sanctions in the eyes of public opinion, experts and politicians.

Although the states continue to use sanctions as an instrument of diplomatic coercion, the Iraq experience has shown the need to search for new directions of economic pressure of some states on others. These include the prohibition of access by individual countries, sectors of the economy, organizations and individuals to institutions or resources, in particular monetary and financial resources of western states.

**Goals.** The main goal of the article is to consider different type of economic sanction's episodes that were considered by different scholars and their findings. Every research found out that there are big differences in the effectiveness of economic sanctions depending their application by sender state; therefore, we have to find out when and in what situation exercise of economic sanctions will less violate human rights and compel the state to change their attitudes towards certain policies.

**History:** According to the history of economic sanctions it can be dated from the Ancient Greek times where Megarian Decree that was a set of economic sanctions levied upon Megara, and it can serve as a good example for the imposition of economic sanctions by ancient states [1]. A brief history of Megarian Decree is that three Athenian women had been kidnapped by the inhabitants of Megara after this Athenians as a reply excluded Megarian merchants from the marketplaces and harbors throughout the Athenian Empire making pressure on its economy. However, the usage of sanctions by states and international organizations has become more prevalent from the 20th century and until now. The imposition of economic sanctions is a debated subject of international relations for today. Since the beginning of 20th century the USA has become a leading actor on imposing sanctions on states and it can be seen from the list of sanctions offered by Peterson Institute for International Economics [2].

Economic sanctions have become the tool of coercion against the states that violate main human rights, breach the international law, destabilize the peace and order in the world and region etc. in the system of international relations. Woodrow Wilson in his speech in Indianapolis in 1919 said that "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist" mentioning the crucial role of economic sanctions in resolving global and regional issues. Nowadays these sanctions play a significant role in preventing the war and conflicts between states enabling a country to reprimand for unacceptable behavior of opposing state in the framework of international law. Although some experts argue that economic sanctions allow the violation of essential human rights in the targeted state and points out the little efficacy of economic sanctions on achieving the targeted goal. In this respect, data collected for the third edition of the book *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* shows that about a one-third of all cases was successful in achieving their objectives [3, p. 45]. Moreover, the work of Daniel Wagner suggests that economic sanctions, imposed between 1945 and 2006, achieved it is stated policy objectives by thirty percent [4]. If it has not a big impact as assumed why states and organizations deploy economic sanctions and how these sanctions should be imposed? In this article, we will attempt to discuss these questions and give our recommendations.

**Research methods.** In this article we apply qualitative methods to analyze and collect the findings and conclusions of scholars and researchers in the economic sanctions' sphere. We will discuss and make conclusion regarding on the findings of scholars and suggest our recommendations depending on the efficacy of different sanction's episodes.

Recent sanction episodes with Russia on annexation of Crimea show us that the economic sanctions could not coerce Russia to surrender Crimea and change its strategic policies whereas comprehensive economic sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the involvement of the UN on nuclear threat to the international peace and security seem to give its results on coercion and deterring actions of the state. Treasury Secretary of the United States Mnuchin claims that Trump sanctions encouraged North Korea to come to negotiating table [5].

Moreover, Russia's nuclear power and its role in the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member challenge policy-makers to coerce the state by economic sanctions.

The different types of economic sanctions can be found in the literatures, books and research papers on this specific topic. We would like to give a brief explanation for the various

types of economic sanctions. “Targeted sanctions” and “smart sanctions” are the terms that can be used interchangeably in the same manner and meaning. Therefore, we use the terms targeted sanctions and smart sanctions in the same meaning avoiding the repetition of the words. The definition of targeted or smart sanctions can be explained by the targeted sanctions that imposed on leaders, political elites and main representatives of a government such as ministries and members of parliament. The targeted sanctions can be directed at the certain group of people in the form of arms embargoes that limit the supply of weapons for the military and political leader, travel bans and asset freezes. In this article we consider the smart sanctions excluding the selective sanctions. However, the difference between targeted and selective sanctions should be determined. Selective” sanctions, which are less broad than comprehensive embargoes, involve restrictions on particular products or financial flows [2]. “Targeted” sanctions focus on certain groups or individuals in the target country and aim to directly impact these groups. Another type of economic sanctions that we consider is threat sanctions [2]. The threat sanctions are meant to announce and declare publicly about the imposition of sanctions before applying these sanctions in action against certain states. These threat sanctions are meant to announce and declare publicly about the imposition of sanctions before applying these sanctions in action against certain states. It means that only announcement of economic sanctions against certain country can give its result, if this country believes that these economic sanctions may harm its economy and population. In that case, targeted country may change its policy preventing the imposition of sanctions by the sender state or international organization.

However, there are certain sanction episodes that explain why some states and international organizations deploy economic sanctions against some countries even they predict possible ineffective outcomes. One of the big reasons stated by Hufbauer (2008): “smart sanctions may satisfy the need in sender states to “do something,” they may slake humanitarian concerns, and they may serve to unify fraying coalitions and isolate a rogue regime”. Here, we think that this point is also true for general economic sanctions as well as for smart sanctions. Therefore, head of economic powers such as USA or economic unions such as EU may apply sanctions against the rogue states’ leaders, political elites and oligarchs. A good example of this can be smart sanctions applied by the USA against Russian political elites and close people to Putin. The USA, applying the smart sanctions, imposed ban on some Russian political representatives for the entrance in the USA and froze bank accounts in the USA and so on.

Sometimes these sanctions episodes might be symbolic or an attempt in representing strong disapproval of the state’s behavior. One of the empirical researches is done by Whang (2011) suggested that in the case of the United States of America, presidents tend to use these economic sanctions because it increases their reputation and gain public support [6]. Moreover, Whang (2011) claims that “even instrumentally ineffective, sanctions are an efficient way of displaying “do something” to the public in the midst of international conflict”; therefore, another main usage of economic sanctions can be elevation of the popularity of the incumbent leaders and in addition it is comparably costless. Therefore, it seems us that sometimes the leaders of certain countries apply economic sanctions to achieve public support or gain more votes before the election. A good example of this can be economic screws against Iran in July 2012 with isolating and penalizing Iran for its refusal to do international obligations related to its nuclear program before the presidential elections [7].

Another reason that can be the application of economic sanctions as an “international punishment” tool that suggested by Nossal (1989). Nossal (1989) argues that some countries may use economic sanctions in pursuing their goals and claims that in these episodes, economic sanctions will not achieve any change in behavior and policy issues [8]. However, from the perspective of imposing sanctions as a tool of punishment it will be effective and rational tool of diplomacy concluded Nossal (1989). Therefore, it should be noted that if the intention of sanctions is retributive

then it is likely to be effective on the ground of imposing harm on the target state.

We assume that imposition of economic sanctions with this kind of intentions is likely to decrease economic sanctions' efficacy in analyzing them in a broad term. Therefore, we think that such episodes as to "do something" cases, gaining public support or retributive reasons should be excluded from the works where researcher's attempt to discover real success of economic sanctions or should be considered properly stating their real intentions on the deployment of economic sanctions. We believe that in this case the success rate of economic sanctions is likely to increase when it is displayed by figures and statistics.

Other common reasons to deploy economic screws seem to be inclusion of deterrence, upholding of international norms, influencing behavior change and prevention of potential threat such as a leader, group or state and so on. These kinds of purposes should be the main strategic goal of whatever actor that orders economic sanctions in order to restore peace and security in the region and world.

Until today, the world has seen a lot of economic sanctions imposed by governments and multinational bodies trying to change the strategic decisions of nation-states and certain leaders that threaten international peace and security. Authors of the book *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* analyzed about 170 economic sanction cases that took place until 2008. The meticulous analysis of the sanction cases represented that the success rate of economic sanctions varies depending on pursued policy goals. Episodes show that economic sanctions could be more effective on affecting modest or limited political changes such as releasing of political prisoners by 51 percent. It means that economic sanctions are likely to be effective is the follow attainable goals and modest political changes that can be acceptable to implement by the sanctioned state. On the other hand, certain political goals that require regime change and democratization, impairment of military potential and an altering its policies in a main direction were only successful by about 30 per cent. Therefore, pursuing big political changes requires much effort and serious considerations in its imposition on the targeted state. Another work suggests that threats on imposing economic sanctions are likely to be more successful than imposed ones [9]. Moreover, an empirical research of Bapat et al. suggests that threat sanctions will be successful in case that these sanctions are under the auspices of international institutes and crucial economic costs on the target states are expected [10]. It can be seen from the examples of economic sanctions that imposed by League of Nations against Yugoslavia and Greece that compelled them to withdraw from the territory of Albania and Bulgaria respectively in 1921 and 1925.

Nossal (1989) claimed that sanctions would be effective if the true objectives are punitive measures and make some harm to targeted state. Sometimes it also can be effective if states use sanctions for retributive punishments with positive inducements, like resuming financial aid or supporting economic wellbeing of sanctioned state. A good example for this can be the case of the USA sanctions imposed on India in 1965 with cancelling food and military aid to India in order to coerce it to reconsider its agricultural policies and this expressed also displeasure on war with Pakistan [11]. As a result, in 1966, Indian government changed its agricultural policies and the USA resumed its aid.

Evidence collected for the book *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* also suggests that expected policy goals should be reasonable and attainable in a bid to achieve possible success from applied sanctions. For example, in the case of Cuba the USA applied the economic sanctions and could not achieve any positive impact rather than making harm on itself with receiving prisoners along with genuine refugees [12]. Moreover, it is cited that the economic sanctions imposed on autocratic regimes are unlikely be successful in achieving stated objectives and policy changes. It can be seen from different sanction episodes such as sanctions deployed against Russia, Cuba, North Korea etc. An imposition of sanctions against autocratic regimes is likely to make more harm for civilians of targeted states and sometimes it violates human rights in the targeted state.

Peksen argues that economic sanctions despite the fact that they fail to achieve intended policy goals they lead to unintended human rights violations [13]. As general economic sanctions will affect, firstly, to the wealth of the targeted state's population and their general economic conditions. The main reason is that in the totalitarian or autocratic states group of people or rulers may suffer less than their population, sometimes these group of people increase their wealth making money on their population. Therefore, the supporters of human rights' movements argue that sender states should apply different type of sanctions in order to compel or change the behavior of the targeted state or group of people who rule the state considering the population of these countries as victims of the regime. For these reasons, "smart sanctions" or "targeted sanctions" can be solution in a bid to avoid counter effects of economic sanctions as negative human rights outcomes, social wellbeing of civilians and so on. Hotton in his findings concludes that targeted sanctions can be effective and decrease human rights violations [14]. Moreover, targeted sanctions should be implemented with proper time limitations and with a thorough examination of targets.

In conclusion, there are different policy goals and intentions on imposing economic sanctions. It might be gaining public support, to "do something" reactions, prevention of potential threats or punitive measures that might be sometimes used for the sanction sender's own goals. Moreover, two types of sanctions are likely to be effective in order to achieve stated policy goals. Firstly, the threat sanctions that imposed in the auspices of international institutes and organizations with the expected crucial economic sanctions, intended punitive measures, attainable goals are likely to be effective to coerce the rogue states. Next, targeted sanctions or smart sanctions are likely to work in achieving intended policy objectives in order to prevent the violation of human rights in the targeted state. Therefore, we would like to give a positive feedback for the application of "targeted" or "smart" sanctions as they will be more effective to coerce the state policy and make less harm to the general public as targeted or smart sanctions avoid to violate the human rights and decrease the wellbeing of the population in the targeted state.

Moreover, the methods on imposition of sanctions can be determining factor in attaining stated policy goals and changes. We have considered and defined that the imposition of economic sanctions with the auspice of international organizations or economic union such as the UN and EU respectively can coerce the rogue state to change its behavior and come to the table of negotiation.

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### **Қай кезде экономикалық санкциялар тиімді болмақ?**

**Аңдатпа.** Әртүрлі кезендерде өткен соғыстар мен басқа қақтығыстардың ақылға қонымсыз нәтижелері ХХ ғасырда орын алып, әлемдегі бейбітшілік пен қауіпсіздікті бұзатын әлемдегі тажалды қауіп-қатерлердің алдын-алуды жүзеге асыратын тиімді механизм ойластырды. Осы мақсаттарда экономикалық санкцияларды енгізу халықаралық қатынастар жүйесіндегі ең қатал және нәтижелі құрал түрі болып көрінді. Осы уақытқа дейін экономикалық санкциялар әртүрлі режимдер мен эпизодтарға қарсы мемлекеттер мен халықаралық ұйымдар тарапынан біржақты тәртіпте және көп жақты тәртіпте қойыла бастады. Дегенмен, өткен тәжірибе көрсеткендей, экономикалық санкциялар әрдайым ықтимал қақтығыстарды болдырмауда және қатыгез мемлекеттердің іс-әрекеттерін тоқтатуда тиімді болмады. Сонымен қатар, экономикалық санкциялардың тиімділігі халықаралық зерттеулердің негізінен талқыланды және әртүрлі ғылыми жұмыстар жүргізілді.

Бұл мақалада ғалымдар мен зерттеушілердің экономикалық санкцияларды қолдануға және санкцияларды қолданудың нақты және тиімді жолдарын анықтауға деген талпыныстары мен жұмыстарына талдау жүргіземіз. Осы уақытқа дейін қойылған әртүрлі санкциялардың нәтижелері мен кемшіліктеріне талдау жасап, қай кезде, қандай мақсатпен қойылған санкциялар тиімді болмақ, соны қарастырамыз. Сонымен қоса, жұмысымызды қортындылап, өзіміздің ұсыныстарымызды білдіреміз.

**Түйін сөздер:** экономикалық санкциялар, смарт санкциялар, халықаралық институттар, АҚШ, біртапты және көптапты санкциялар.

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**Аннотация.** Как показывают результаты прошлых войн и других конфликтов, имевших место в 20-м веке, заставили государства задуматься о создании механизма предотвращения потенциальных угроз в мире, которые нарушают международный мир и безопасность. В этих целях введение экономических санкций представляется наиболее грозным и применимым инструментом в системе международных отношений. До настоящего времени экономические санкции в одностороннем и многостороннем порядке применяются государствами и международными организациями против различных режимов и ситуации. Однако прошлый опыт показал, что экономические санкции не всегда эффективны для сдерживания возможных конфликтов и сдерживания действий государств-изгоев. Более того, эффективность экономических санкций стала главным предметом дискуссий в международных исследованиях. В этой статье мы проанализируем работы ученых и исследователей по применению экономических санкций и попытаемся определить конкретные и эффективные способы применения санкций. Данные применения санкций перечислены и собраны в документе, мы же даем рекомендации.

**Ключевые слова:** экономические санкции, смарт санкции, международные институты, Соединенные Штаты Америки, государства-изгои, односторонние и многосторонние санкции.

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