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## Institutionalization of China's New Engagement with Central Asia

**Abstract.** *The article attempts to explore the nature and timing of China's new diplomatic engagement with the Central Asian region as a result of the two foreign ministers' meetings of China and Central Asian states that took place in 2020 and 2021. The objective of this study is to compare China's previous and current approaches to the Central Asian region. In doing so, this study attempts to contribute to the existing body of literature and shed light on the latest Sino-Central Asian diplomatic developments. The study heavily relies on the method of discourse analysis when interpreting the speeches of the foreign ministers of China and five Central Asian states at the foreign ministers' meetings. After having reviewed a large number of literature on the Sino-Central Asian engagement, this study finds that the current Chinese approach towards the Central Asian region has become substantially complex and multi-faceted. The article concludes that the launch of the foreign ministers' meeting platform and its further institutionalization is the gradual manifestation of China's "striving for achievement" strategy which seeks to reorient Beijing's focus from economic considerations to political ones.*

**Keywords:** C+C5, global challenges, Chinese foreign policy, China's Central Asian diplomacy, "community of common destiny"

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### Introduction

The launch of the new diplomatic platform of the China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting (C+C5) in 2020 and its continuation in 2021 signifies China's gradual abandonment of its previously held foreign policy stance of "keeping a low profile" (shanyu shouzhuo) that was aimed at ensuring a favorable condition for China's stable economic development. As it has been argued by Yan Xuetong, consequently in recent years China has re-adjusted its foreign

policy focus to the "striving for achievement" strategy (fenfa youwei) which has greater political orientation [1]. Thus, it can be argued that the initiation of the C+C5 platform and its further institutionalization is the gradual manifestation of China's "striving for achievement" strategy.

The first foreign ministers' meeting in the format of C5+1 that involved China and the Central Asian states took place on July 16, 2020, and it mainly focused on alleviating the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ways of recovering the economies of the

region. The meeting was held virtually, and the parties discussed the possibilities of providing more agricultural products to China, while the People's Republic of China (PRC) expressed its willingness to present a green corridor for its products to the Central Asian countries [2].

The second C+C5 foreign ministers' meeting has been hosted by the PRC's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the Chinese city of Xi'an on May 12, 2021, and it was attended by the current foreign ministers of the five Central Asian states in person. This meeting has produced several important documents and had a substantial practical meaning compared to the first meeting. It is pertinent to note that the selection of Xi'an as a place for the foreign ministers' meeting of China and Central Asia has a symbolic meaning in and of itself as the origin of the ancient Silk Road that connected China with the Central Asians in the past.

Considering that the format of China and Central Asia foreign ministers' meeting is a recent development, we believe that the scholarly work on this new platform is in the making and we will be able to see a growing number of literatures on this topic in the near future. Nevertheless, there are important questions that need to be addressed at this point. Therefore, this paper is preoccupied with the following research questions: why is C+C5 platform being developed now? How does it differ from China's previous approach toward Central Asia? These questions need to be explored in order to provide an analytical basis for the current Sino-Central Asia relations.

The research goal is to explore the nature and timing of China's new diplomatic engagement with the Central Asian region from China's perspective since including the Central Asian approach requires more extensive and separate research in its own right. Furthermore, another objective of this study is to assess how China has been approaching the Central Asian region since the early 1990s by looking at various Chinese initiatives directed toward this region. In doing so this study attempts to contribute to the existing body of literature and shed light on the latest Sino-Central Asian diplomatic developments.

## Methodology and the main argument

The *research methodology* of the paper stems from the attempt of coming up with the most compelling responses to the above-mentioned questions and therefore it heavily relies on the method of discourse analysis when interpreting the speech of the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in particular at the C+C5 meetings.

This paper argues that China's new engagement with the Central Asian region is caused by the new international challenges that affect this region directly or indirectly such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the possible destabilization of the region as a result of the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. After having reviewed a large number of literature on the Sino-Central Asian engagement, this study finds that the current Chinese approach towards the Central Asian region has become substantially complex and multi-faceted and it is likely to be more so as a result of the PRC's proactive foreign policy within the context of growing global challenges. It can be observed that China reconsiders its Central Asia policy in accordance with the new international challenges such as the pandemic, the need for a green economy, climate change, digitalization, etc. Hence, it can be observed that Sino-Central Asian relations are prone to updates within the grand strategies of China.

In order to fulfill its objectives, this paper first looks at the existing literature on how China has been approaching Central Asia as a region. Then it turns to how Beijing's Central Asia policy has been evolving from the early 1990s until recent times. It will be followed by the analysis of the China and Central Asia foreign ministers' meeting and how it came to fruition in the first place.

## Discussion of previous studies on China's central Asia policy

The sino-Central Asian relationship has been assessed from various perspectives beginning from the common regional security and economic interests, China's energy consumption, PRC's

grand strategy of “peaceful rise” to the notion of a new Great Game in Central Asia. When exploring China-Central Asia relations, Hsiu-Ling Wu and Chien-Hsun Chen pay heed to the economic collaboration between China and the five Central Asian countries by providing the features and patterns of bilateral trade from the 1990s to the early 2000s and observing that the bilateral trade volume in that period had increased significantly. Moreover, they assessed the Chinese investments in each Central Asian country separately and noted that the amount of direct investment by China in this region was relatively small. As a result, they concluded that the economic cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries had not reached its fullest form by the early 2000s [3].

Kevin Sheives thoroughly analyzes the political relations between China and the Central Asian states through the prism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in particular. He observes that it was preferable both for China and the Central Asian countries to interact within the frames of the SCO than opting for a bilateral format. Furthermore, he asserts that the major determinants of China's policy toward Central Asia will be regional stability and energy trade in short and long-term perspectives [4; 214 p.].

Furthermore, Chien-peng Chung provides a comprehensive overview of how China sought to engage the Central Asian countries first via the ‘Shanghai Five’ and later the SCO by tying it to its security concerns in its northwestern frontiers. By the same token, he alludes that the Chinese culture will not be attractive to the people of Central Asia any time soon considering their Turkic and Persian backgrounds and the existing Russian influence [5; 1007 p.]. David Schambaugh in his observations written in the early 2000s looked at the Chinese approach toward Central Asia through the perspectives of the SCO and emphasized that China was more deeply involved with the SCO compared to other regional institutions [6]. Thus, this observation implies that China had put a great emphasis on its Central Asia policy as it continued to rise. Another author who explores China's Central Asia policy through the lens of the SCO is Marc

Lanteigne who provides a background on how this institution evolved. He likened the SCO to a security community that enabled the process of “socialization” among its members and highlighted its consensus-based, community model which allowed its members to maintain their commitments to other international organizations [7].

Michael Clarke assesses China's foreign policy in Central Asia as the manifestation of Beijing's grander “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) strategy that was developed in the early 1990s as a way of maintaining China's continuous economic development [8; 108 p.]. Unlike him, Niklas Swanstrom emphasized the intention of China in Central Asia which can be characterized as the one that seeks to assert control over the region that can be compared to a classical vassal relationship where China will provide security, investments, and trade, whereas the Central Asian states will have to provide political stability [9; 570 p.].

In contrast, Jeffrey Reeves observes that China's approach to the Central Asian region has constituted a ‘disparate pattern of engagement’ and with the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in 2013, China seeks to unify all previous multiple forms of engagement into one approach [10; 2 p.]. By the same token, Raffaello Pantucci argues that China's interest in Central Asia originates from the calculation that prosperous Central Asia will create a knock-on effect on Xinjiang by bringing economic development and political stability to its western province [11; 8 p.].

Adil Kaukenov underlines the pragmatism in Chinese diplomacy towards Central Asia and the constant emphasis on the facilitation of the good-neighborliness policy and the implementation of their economic interests. He also notes that the Central Asian region has become the testing ground for numerous Chinese diplomatic initiatives that have never been implemented elsewhere. Kaukenov emphasizes that the Chinese Central Asian diplomacy encompasses two principles – “good neighborliness and partnership” – that include “friendship, security, and prosperity”, where the term “friendship” touches upon the political links, while “security”

corresponds to ensuring the atmosphere of security among the countries and “prosperity” can be referred to the economic policy [12].

Unlike Reeves, Robert Sutter argues that China’s approach toward Central Asia has been coherent, stable, and successful and it promises to continue along these lines in the future as well. He notes the fact that the Chinese leaders managed to pursue China’s interests in the region without any conflict hence ensuring the durability of China’s approach toward Central Asia. He alludes that part of this success was possible due to the lack of territorial disputes and nationalistic issues between the PRC and the Central Asian countries as it is the case with the countries in Southeast Asia [13; 250-253 p.].

In exploring the reasons for launching the China-Central Asia foreign ministers’ meeting in July 2020, the Central Asia Analytical Network (CAAN) emphasized three factors such as opposing the US in the region, seizing the moment offered by the global pandemic and economic crisis, and controlling the integration processes in the region since having the Central Asian countries integrated against Beijing, in particular, is the least desirable outcome for the PRC. The CAAN also underscores that this new diplomatic platform will contribute to the betterment of China’s image in the region where the sinophobic sentiments are substantially constant [14].

Thus far it can be inferred that the literature on Sino-Central Asia relations is extensive, and it is continuously growing. However, our review has revealed that the studies on China’s Central Asia policy were substantially similar to one another especially in the 2000s in terms of their emphasis on China’s security concerns in Central Asia that stemmed from its possible spillover to Xinjiang and Beijing’s economic and energy interests in this region. Since the Sino-Central Asia connections have been upgraded with the evolution of China’s overall foreign policy, more comprehensive and innovative studies have been done in recent years thus enriching the existing literature. In contrast, the studies on the recent China-Central Asia foreign ministers’ meeting platform are in its inception considering the recent emergence of this format. Certainly, it will

remain a crucial topic for both China specialists and Central Asia observers in the foreseeable future.

### **Evolution of China’s approach towards Central Asia**

China’s earliest approach to Central Asia stemmed from the PRC’s desire to establish economic connections with the newly independent post-Soviet countries in this region and at the same time ensure ethnic and political stability in its Xinjiang province [4; p. 207]. The former Chinese Premier Li Peng’s Central Asian tour in April 1994 which included visits to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan highlighted these aspects as well as the emphasis on Beijing’s benign intentions in the region and in regard to the newly independent Central Asian states [8; p. 118]. Premier Li underlined the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and non-interference in domestic affairs in forging China’s relationship with the Central Asian states [3, 8; 118 p.], therefore establishing the ruling principles of the Sino-Central Asian relationship from the very beginning.

In the early 1990s, China was especially concerned about the possibility of a security vacuum emerging in Central Asia thus it was motivated to embark upon diplomatic talks to ensure border security and achieve a mutually acceptable delimitation and demarcation with the bordering countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan – and Russia. In April 1996, they signed Five-Power Agreement that regulated the military activity in the frontier regions and prohibited provocative military exercises [7]. Hence, China’s engagement with the Central Asian region developed within the frames of the informal “Shanghai Five” meetings that aimed to maintain coordination of common security concerns. By 2000, the participant countries noted that they had attained a “new security view” on the basis of mutual trust, equality, and cooperation and this achievement had been called by then Chinese President Jiang Zemin a “Shanghai spirit” [13; p. 258]. It included the ideas of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,

peaceful bargaining, and respect for differences as the main principles that would guide the relations between China and the Central Asian states [5; 992 p.]. With the addition of Uzbekistan into the SCO in 2001, China-Central Asia interactions stepped into an institutionalized relationship that focused on regional strategic cooperation.

Moreover, in the economic sphere, the Chinese government sought to encourage its state-owned and private enterprises to go and explore the Central Asian market in the process of implementing its internal economic development strategies such as the “Great Development of the Western Regions” (xibu dakaifa) and “Going-Out” (zou chuqu) in the early 2000s [5; 996 p.].

Clarke distinguishes three phases of China’s Central Asia policy between 1991 and 2006. In the first phase from 1991 to 1995, as China did not have a coherent approach to the emerging new international and regional order, it sought to ensure Xinjiang’s security in the wake of national and religious revival in Central Asia. The second period from 1996 to 2001 can be marked by the practice of China’s “peaceful rise” strategy in the region during which the PRC attempted to heighten its influence through the platform of the “Shanghai Five”. In the third period from 2001 and 2006, China re-inforced the “peaceful rise” policy in Central Asia on the basis of the acknowledgment of its relative weaknesses in the region [8; 115-116 p.] compared to the Russian historical influence and emerging American presence at the time.

During this period China had decided to intensify its relationship with the region as a whole and pay attention to developing trade and investment connections with the Central Asian countries [3]. It was the case because China felt that it was encountering roadblocks in Central Asia by looking at the expansion of the American military presence in the region and the potential renewal of the Russian regional security interest as well [5; 994-995 p.]. In doing so, China sought to utilize the SCO that initially focused on border security and stability, by adding the dimension of economic cooperation with its member states. At the SCO summit in 2003, China emphasized the importance of promoting trade and

investment, and such areas as transport, energy, telecommunications, and agriculture were highlighted as the priority spheres [3; 1064 p.].

During this period China began to approach Central Asia within the scope of its “good neighbor policy” (mulin zhengce) that had been stressed at the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2002. It was declared that China would aim to pursue the ‘policy of securing an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighborhood’ (mulin, anlin, fulin) [16; p. 254] through confidence-building measures with the neighboring countries, closer cooperation, and mutual trust [15].

Later the Central Asian region was considered by the PRC through the lens of the notion of a “harmonious region” when Hu Jintao proposed to construct “a harmonious region on the basis of long-term peace and common prosperity” in his SCO summit speech in 2006. According to Zhao Huasheng although the concept of “harmonious region” can be applied to any region in the world, this was the first time when a particular region (i.e. Central Asia) was defined within the frames of this concept [17, 47 p.].

Since 2013 China’s policy toward Central Asia has been formulated within the frames of the SREB project that involves the Central Asian countries as transit states along the continental part of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Nevertheless, as Reeves observes, China’s approach towards the region did not change with the launch of this initiative, since the SREB projects represent the previous initiatives now under a new label [10; 2 p.]. It should be noted that this new format of Sino-Central Asian engagement currently encompasses multiple sectors starting from economic projects, political dialogue, and security cooperation to socio-cultural exchanges. Now one can observe the plurality of actors that are involved in the Sino-Central Asian relationship such as state-owned organizations, Chinese embassies, Confucius Institutes, and Chinese universities the Chinese artists and students. This policy is assessed by the researchers as a more unified and coordinated approach compared to the previous forms of Chinese engagement in Central Asia [10; 3 p.].

One can observe that China's current approach to the region is substantially complex and comprehensive in nature compared to the previous stages of engagement. This time the engagement is channeled through both the government and private sector as well [11]. This demonstrates how the Sino-Central Asia relationship can evolve from simple security concerns and economic connections to the multi-faceted complex engagement that exists today.

### **The format of C+C5 foreign ministers' meeting**

Certainly, the new format known as the foreign ministers' meeting of China and Central Asian states is a diplomatic dimension of a complex and multifaceted Chinese policy towards the Central Asian region. Previously the diplomatic aspects of Sino-Central Asian relations were practiced within the Shanghai Five, the SCO, and bilateral meetings between China and an individual Central Asian country. Now it is the first diplomatic platform that gathers all five Central Asian foreign ministers together. It was the case with the other C5+1 formats organized by Japan, South Korea, the US, and Russia in the last two decades.

As a result of the first C+C5 meeting, the six countries had issued a Joint Statement that included six points on the ways of jointly facing the new challenges in the fields of public health, economic recovery, agriculture, "three evils", peace process in Afghanistan, etc. The decision to create a new format of China and Central Asia foreign ministers' meeting was first documented in the Joint Statement that was issued as a result of the first C+C5 meeting in 2020. This document expressed the willingness of the parties to meet once a year in order to promote cooperation under new conditions and global challenges. It was also agreed that the extraordinary meetings will be organized, if necessary, by the agreement of all sides [18].

Afterwards, some Central Asian experts argued that the Chinese version of foreign ministers' meeting with the Central Asian countries is relatively vague compared to the similar formats developed by the United

States and Russia. It has been observed that the American format C5+1 is region-centric in its nature, and it recognizes Central Asia as a separate and united region, whereas the Russian version of "5+1" can be considered as a response to the American one. Russia does not see Central Asia as a separate region and hence views its "5+1" platform as a Russia-centered format [19]. However, the second C+C5 meeting seems less ambiguous compared to the last year's meeting and more ambitious in terms of its goals and actions. China Daily emphasized that the second meeting had more practical significance than the first virtual meeting. Moreover, it stressed the normative aspects of this new format by stating that "the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the six countries' understanding of the fact that the region is essentially a community with a shared future" [20].

Foreign ministers of all the five Central Asian states – Mukhtar Tleuberdi (Kazakhstan), Ruslan Kazakbaev (Kyrgyzstan), Sirojiddin Muhridin (Tajikistan), Rashid Meredov (Turkmenistan), and Abdulaziz Kamilov (Uzbekistan) have attended the meeting. Wang Yi underscored that having constructed the 30 years-long cooperative relations, China and the Central Asian countries should look for 'the new-type regional cooperation path' that is compatible with the challenges of today. In doing so, he highlighted the following five points. First, the parties should work together to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and construct a global 'community of health' (weisheng jiankang gongtongti). Second, China and Central Asia should promote innovations along SREB by increasing high-tech cooperation. Third, a grand Eurasian passageway of interconnectivity should be built in order to expand the transport corridor between Asia and Europe. Fourth, the sides should work together to ensure regional security and fight against the 'three evils' of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Fifth, China and Central Asian states should foster cooperation to overcome new challenges such as climate change, biodiversity protection, Aral Sea governance, etc. [21].

Along with this new approach in further developing Sino-Central Asian cooperation, certain practical proposals have been made in

terms of establishing three centers such as China-Central Asia Agricultural Cooperation Center (Zhongguo-Zhongya nongye hezuo zhongxin), "Silk Road Archeological Cooperation Research Center" (Sichou zhilu kaogu hezuo yanjiu zhongxin) and the Centers of traditional medicine in Central Asian countries. Moreover, three plans were adopted that were directed to professional training and education of the Central Asians. Namely, it was proposed to set up Luban Workshops (Luban Gongfang) in each of the Central Asian country during the next three years within the plan entitled "One country, one workshop" (yiguo yifang jihua) (CAA Network, 2021). So far, the Luban Workshops have been established in several dozens of countries around the world including Thailand, the UK, Portugal, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Madagascar, Egypt, etc. since the launch of the program by the Tianjin Municipality in 2016. The Luban Workshop programs aim to train local professional and technical personnel in foreign countries [22]. Hence, Beijing's intention to set up Luban Workshops in Central Asia indicates its willingness to upgrade Sino-Central Asia relations to meet the demands of the local population in Central Asian countries as it was the case in some African countries and Pakistan where local people expressed their dissatisfaction with being left out of the Chinese projects.

As a result of the second meeting, China and the five Central Asian countries have adopted three Joint Statements: The joint Statement on the joint response to the current pandemic, the Joint Statement on deepening the sub-national (local) cooperation, and the Joint Statement on the Afghan issue on which the parties expressed their support to peaceful recovery of Afghanistan [23, 21].

Furthermore, China pledged to provide 450 scholarships to the Central Asian states in the coming three years within the frames of the 'professional training plan' (jiaoyu peixun jihua). By the same token, another plan on "poverty eradication and increasing effectiveness of agriculture" was adopted within which China announced organizing training courses for 100 people who work in the sphere of poverty

alleviation in the Central Asian countries during the next three years [23]. The allocation of these types of new scholarships and plans to open Luban workshops manifest that China's scholarships and training courses directed towards the Central Asian states are being diversified to include the non-traditional aspects of interest unlike the previous focus on providing courses on culture and language.

Another diplomatic development has been the signing of the Memorandum on the Establishment of the Mechanism for China and Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting which implies that China is willing to institutionalize this new format with the aim of granting it a regular character. Although the text of the Memorandum has not been made public, yet it can be inferred that the C+C5 platform will continue with one-year regularity as it was indicated in the Joint Statement in July 2020. This is a novel development in Sino-Central Asian relations in the sense that this format does not include any outside third power as it was the case in 'Shanghai Five' and the SCO. It signifies China's attempt to institutionalize its engagement with the Central Asian region in accordance with its growing global economic and political clout. Moreover, all the above-mentioned commitments by China indicate the beginning of the PRC's new diplomatic approach towards Central Asia that can be characterized by its multi-faceted and coordinated feature and being in line with the current global challenges.

One aspect that should be paid an important heed to is the specific mention of Central Asia within the frames of the concept of "community of common destiny" titled "China-Central Asia Community of a shared future" (Zhongguo Zhongya mingyun gongtongti). Although some scholars have already argued that the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is mainly directed toward China's neighboring countries [24; p. 70], this is the first time when this concept has been designated to a specific geographical region. Number of authors noted that the concept of a "community of common destiny" constitute an ideational aspect of the BRI, whereas the BRI itself can be regarded as the practical component with

concrete actions [25, 24, 26]. Hence one can infer that this can be viewed as a first step toward implementing this ideational concept in Central Asia. However, one can notice that this time the concept of “community of common destiny” was left undefined without any mention of concrete plans or actions in the context of Central Asia.

Building upon the above observations this paper argues that the new challenges such as the current pandemic and the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in September 2021 are opening the window of opportunity for China to play an active role in the Central Asian region now with the aim of ensuring regional stability. Chinese analysts emphasize the concerns expressed by the Chinese foreign minister at the meeting regarding the potential security vacuum in Afghanistan after the US pullout and its implications on security in Central Asia [27].

## Results

Overall, this study offers the following findings. First, China began to commit itself to a multi-faceted approach in Central Asia. Second, the PRC is more determined to offer practical plans to materialize its engagement in the region. Third, China is willing to engage the Central Asian region in the normative aspect too.

Furthermore, this study reveals that China’s new engagement with Central Asia is substantially different from the previous diplomatic approach of its focus on solely Central Asian countries themselves and its attempt to instill institutionalization. By the same token, the new C+C5 mechanism can be distinguished by its attention to specific issues and attempts to resolve them collectively. So far, it has produced more concrete plans in terms of resolving common issues such as the challenges of the pandemic, developing high-tech cooperation, ensuring

regional stability, and addressing poverty alleviation and environmental degradation being the primary foci. Apart from the inter-governmental interaction that was dominant in previous years, this new engagement involves multiple actors ranging from state-owned organizations, embassies, universities, entrepreneurs, and teachers to individuals such as actors, singers, or students who are interested in connecting the two sides. It can be inferred that China’s new approach to Central Asia is likely to develop further in this manner in the foreseeable future.

## Conclusion

China’s new institutionalized approach towards the Central Asian region demonstrates that with the changing international environment, the PRC has made substantial adjustments in its Central Asian diplomacy. A corollary is that the launch of the C+C5 platform and its further institutionalization is the gradual manifestation of China’s “striving for achievement” strategy which seeks to reorient Beijing’s focus from the economic consideration to the political ones. Consequently, the future development of Sino-Central Asian relations depends on multiple political factors such as regional stability, the situation in Afghanistan, the involvement of other regional players in the region, and the domestic political stability of the Central Asian states. The C+C5 format seems to continue to play an important role in fostering Sino-Central Asian dialogue further. Thus far, it has engaged the five Central Asian countries that do not possess a unified set of policies toward China in a coordinated way into one platform with the PRC. This demonstrates that China is increasingly paying attention to and acting upon the global challenges within the context of specific regions.

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### **Қытайдың Орталық Азиямен жаңа өзара әрекеттестігінің институциаландырылуы**

**Аңдатпа.** Берілген мақала Қытай-Орталық Азия сыртқы істер министрлерінің 2020 және 2021 жылдары орын алған екі отырысы нәтижесінде Қытайдың аталмыш аймаққа арналған жаңа дипломатиясының мәнін және оның іске асырылуы үшін таңдалған уақытты зерттеуге тырысады. Бұл зерттеудің мақсаты – Қытайдың Орталық Азия аймағына бағытталған осыған дейінгі және қазіргі саясатын салыстыру. Осылайша, аталмыш зерттеу берілген бағыт бойынша осыған дейін жазылған әдебиетке өз үлесін қосуға және соңғы Қытай-Орталық Азия дипломатиялық қатынастары бойынша сараптама қамтамасыз етуге ұмтылады. Мақала алты ел сыртқы істер министрлері отырыстарында сөйленген сөздерді талдауда дискурс сараптау әдісін кеңінен қолданады. Қытай-Орталық Азия қатынастары туралы бірнеше әдебиетке шолу жасаған соң, бұл зерттеу Қытай Халық Республикасының Орталық Азияға деген саясатының өте кешенді және көп салалы деңгейге жеткендігін анықтайды. Мақала сыртқы істер министрлері отырысы механизміне бастаманың берілуі және оның одан әрі институциаландырылуы Қытайдың экономикалық іс-әрекеттерден гөрі саяси аспектілерге көбірек мән беретін «жетістіктерге қол жеткізуге ұмтылу» стратегиясының біртіндеп көрініс табуы деп қорытындылайды.

**Түйін сөздер:** С+С5, ғаламдық сын-тегеуріндер, Қытайдың сыртқы саясаты, Қытайдың Орталық Азия дипломатиясы, «тағдыры ортақ жаһандық қауымдастық»

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### **Институционализация нового взаимодействия Китая с Центральной Азией**

**Аннотация.** В данной статье делается попытка изучить характер и сроки нового дипломатического взаимодействия Китая с центральноазиатским регионом в результате двух встреч министров иностранных дел Китая и государств Центральной Азии, которые состоялись в 2020 и 2021 годах. Целью данного исследования является сравнение прежнего и нынешнего подходов Китая к региону Центральной Азии в целом. Таким образом, данное исследование пытается внести вклад в существующую литературу и пролить свет на последние дипломатические события, касающиеся Китая и Центральной Азии. Данное исследование во многом опирается на метод дискурсивного анализа при интерпретации докладов выступлений министров иностранных дел Китая и пяти государств Центральной Азии на встречах министров иностранных дел. Изучив большое количество литературы по взаимодействию Китая и Центральной Азии, данная статья показывает, что нынешний китайский подход к региону Центральной Азии стал существенно комплексным и многогранным. В статье делается вывод о том, что запуск механизма встреч министров иностранных дел и ее дальнейшая институционализация – это постепенное проявление ки-

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тайской стратегии «стремления к достижениям», которая направлена на переориентацию внимания Китайской Народной Республики с экономических соображений на политические.

**Ключевые слова:** С+С5, глобальные вызовы, внешняя политика Китая, центральноазиатская дипломатия Китая, «сообщество единой судьбы человечества»

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