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Soft power and foreign policy of the Russian Federation: some aspects of the present

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the analysis of the development and transformations of the Russian Federation foreign policy. Since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, the policy of Russia is undoubtedly one of the most researching areas in modern political science these days due to many practical aspects. It objectively dynamically develops and transforms in accordance with the promising new role of this state on the world stage. The purpose of the article is to determine the involvement of Soft power elements in their modernization and transformation in the further implementation of Russian foreign policy in the world space in the short and medium term. As a result, the article attempts to determine the main conceptual changes in Russian foreign policy and certain forecasts about the directions of possible upgrades and improvements in the translation and promotion of Soft power by the Russian side in the foreign policy space. In the course of the analysis, the authors came to the conclusion that the main participants in the political confrontation on the world stage in the near future will actively develop and improve the Soft power technology in their foreign policy. Objectively, they will also receive a new impetus to the development of methods and technologies for counteraction, strengthening their constant application in practice. Thus, the leading countries, including Russia, are drawn into a kind of "arms race" in the format of the unarmed advancement of their foreign policy interests.

Key words: «Soft power», «global project», «ideological concept», «ideological confrontation», «multipolar world».

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Introduction

The beginning of military operations of the Russian Federation in Ukraine was perceived by many experts and specialists as a total transition of Russian foreign policy to a purely forceful principle. However, both the analysis of the unfolding events in Ukraine and Moscow's actions on the world stage indicate that the content of the Soft power component in their foreign policy is just beginning to grow. The confrontation in Ukraine is perceived in Russia not as a conflict between two neighboring states, but as a struggle to restore not once lost status, not a world power, but one of the most important world players. In this struggle, a new global cultural project will undoubtedly appear, which should become an alternative to the Western global project.

Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation political elite, the expert community came to the conclusion that victory in Ukraine is possible only when victory is achieved in the information space. Victory in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the world is possible only when own global project is portrayed. The meanings and nominatives of the new global perception of reality can be conveyed to the broad masses of the world's population only through Soft power.

The article presents the results of an analysis of one of the possible promising areas of Russian foreign policy in the near future. The goal is to determine the involvement of elements of Soft power in the further implementation of Russian foreign policy in the global space. This article is one of the attempts in the Republic of Kazakhstan to analyze and form certain elements of the theoretical model of the foreign policy actions of the northern neighbor.

Methods

The work uses theoretical methods such as comparative, structural-functional analysis and inductive-deductive analysis. Structural-functional research used in the determination of required elements of soft tissues as a more effective promotion of a new global-cultural project of the world.

Result and discussion

After February 2022, in its foreign policy actions Russian Federation demonstrates a constant desire for modernization in its conceptual parameter. With a high degree of certainty, it can be noted that the Russian leadership in its foreign policy has moved away from the concept of adaptation to existing conditions. The reforms carried out and the strengthening of the state led to the transition to the format of its own formation of the necessary conditions for the pursued foreign policy line. The starting point for such a transition can undoubtedly be the call for the formation of a multipolar world. The point of practical transition is the demand for security guarantees to NATO and a return to the 1997 borders [1], with subsequent developments.

These actions represent the next step in achieving the main political goal - the return of Russia to the ranks of global powers. In the foreseeable future, such a goal may well act as the main one. Trends in global development have significantly changed the conditions for the transformation and functioning of global powers. Naturally, such moments as a powerful army and a strong

economy have not disappeared, but today they are just a complementary component. The central component of global power is the global project. A certain cultural concept that justifies the moral and ethical right and legitimation of a leading role in the world or region.

Today, the only state that has such a global project is United States [2]. The role of promoting and defending democracy has shaped in the eyes of the world's elites and ordinary people the right to global domination. Today, it is this component that allows the overstrained hegemon to continue to maintain its hegemony in many parts of the world. Based on this concept, we can also assume why the United States and Western countries began a confrontation with the Russian Federation, and not with China. Although in economic and geo-economic terms, China is a stronger opponent. The answer may be that China does not have its own global project or idea, and this is its main weak point in geopolitical terms. All the ideological concepts broadcast from China today, at most, can be oriented towards the Asian region, and not as a global space. Russia today put forward its global idea or project, which automatically turns it into a more dangerous and significant adversary.

The ideological concept of Russian global politics put forward by the Russian leadership is based on the ideas of conservatism and traditionalism. It is an opponent of the Western liberal ideology that is dominant today, the bearers of which are the countries of the West. Today, the system of ideological confrontation is once again being restored in the world, with the possibility of returning to bipolarity, or, as it is customary called it today, multipolarity.

Having put forward its ideological concept, Russia entered, first of all, into an ideological confrontation with the West. It must be understood that the elites of Western countries were well aware of the beginning of such a confrontation and immediately took preventive measures on the ideological and information front, blocking the work of RT and other media. In some Western countries, even Dozhd, which has a pronounced opposition position, got it.

Having put forward an ideological concept for the time being, which should gradually turn into a functional global project, understandable and close to the heart in any corner of the Earth, Russia will naturally use Soft power to the maximum to promote it[3]. This is an objective reality. Today, the Russian Federation does not have significant resource potential for the forceful imposition of its ideas, both outside its borders and on the international political platform. At the same time, we must understand that the Russian Soft Power will differ from the classical system and have its own specifics.

The differences and specifics of modern Russian Soft power comes from many different factors. Structurally determining factors can be divided into two main groups. The first group represents economic resources and opportunities. In broadcasting their soft power for any state, they play a decisive role in many respects. The Western bloc will actively fight the Russian economy through economic sanctions. At the same time, for most experts it is clear that the maximum they can achieve is a slowdown in the Russian economy and a decrease in the amount of free financial resources. It is the elimination of free financial and economic resources that is the main goal of Western sanctions policy. It is necessary to neutralize foreign policy activity in the world as much as possible and deprive the resource potential of the image of a fighter against Western dominance that is gaining strength in the eyes of the world community.

In such conditions, the Russian leadership will use regional breakthrough tactics of using soft power. An actual example is the current Middle East policy of the Russian Federation. After the use of military force, massively and concentrated on target audiences, the image of a security guarantor is pumped up from external and internal shocks. This approach makes it possible not to scatter especially economic resources and to implement them with maximum benefit. One can endlessly argue about the effectiveness of this approach, but the failure of the Western sanctions concept in OPEC+ speaks volumes [4].

The second group of factors that form the specifics of the Russian Soft power, from the American and Western models, is created by aspects of the psychological and social plan. The psychological and social context of the Russian Soft power and its promotion is based on two main components. Firstly, positioning oneself as a defender of the idea of generally accepted traditions that is understandable even to a simple layman. For understanding, it should be noted that the modern liberal idea sees as its target audience the political, economic, and cultural elite of societies, as well as a socially active minority with a manic messianic desire to improve society.

In fact, we are witnessing the second moment of change in Russia's foreign policy strategy at the present stage. The conceptual change is taking place in the area of policy lineage. The orientation of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century towards the elites led to the complete failure of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine is just a direct confirmation of this. The current situation in this country is a direct result of foreign policy failure.

The second component is certainly based on opposing oneself to the American and the Western. In this component lies, first of all, the fact that the majority of the ordinary population in a significant part of the globe has a very negative attitude towards everything Western, including American. To a large extent, the colonial past of most of the planet is affected here. The cultural-mental situation in China can serve as an example here. Despite the significant rapprochement between China and the West from the time of Carter to the end of Hu Jintao's reign, a significant aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union, up to armed conflicts. For the majority of Chinese, both those living in China and for a certain part of the Chinese diaspora outside it, the opium wars and the Nanjing massacre [5] are fundamental moments in the national perception of the world. One of the most ancient rules: "the enemy of my enemy, my friend" operates flawlessly in the toolkit of Russian foreign policy.

Systemically, the Russian leadership will proceed from the golden balance of resources, opportunities and foreign policy tasks in a particular region. An important point in the implementation of the Russian Federation's own Soft power are the mechanisms for promoting its non-coercive influence in the world. In addition to the generally accepted mechanisms for broadcasting and taking into account significant opposition from the countries of the Western coalition, the Russian Federation will try to create and apply new, more secure elements of promotion and broadcasting of Soft power.

Faced with real opposition, the Russian side is now intensively developing both new conceptual approaches to the implementation of Soft power, as well as new methods and mechanisms for its translation. Today, it is precisely the issue of mechanisms that is most acute for Russian foreign policy. Its complexity is largely due to the very tight deadlines for translating

the Russian global project into reality. The “window of opportunity” that opened after Syria cannot be permanently open, since the preferences of the masses are always distinguished by their innate fickleness.

Already today, Russia is clearly looming regional approach in the selection and use of mechanisms to promote its own soft power. Undoubtedly, both objective and subjective factors contribute to this. One of these is the "food" factor. For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that Russia did not create this instrument on its own. It arose as a result of not entirely thought-out political pressure from Western countries on the Russian side in the framework of the Ukrainian conflict.

Until recently, Ukraine has been one of the leading exporters of food products and grain. Its withdrawal from the global export system hit food markets hard. With the outbreak of hostilities and the establishment of total control over transportation across the Black Sea, a large amount of grain was stuck on the territory of Ukraine. Its actual belonging to either Ukraine or international corporations does not matter much. The whole point is that Western politicians of the highest rank in unison began to declare that the naval blockade of Ukrainian ports led to total starvation in poor countries, especially in the African region.

Naturally, under such pressure to which he joined, and the UN Secretary, Russia went to the grain deal[6]. It was in the design of the grain deal, in its design, that the emerging mechanism was immediately visible not just for broadcasting, but for the total promotion of anti-Western sentiments and Russian Soft power to the audience designated by Western partners. Even the attack of Ukraine by sea drones on Sevastopol, the sabotage on the Crimean bridge, and all the frightening statements by the Russian side about withdrawing from the “grain deal” could not stop it. The completion of its implementation was supposed to bring huge foreign policy dividends to the Russian Federation, and as we see, they received them.

At the very beginning of the grain deal, the Russian side proceeded from at least three main components. Firstly, no one was going to take grain to the starving part of the world in the conditions of the beginning food crisis in Europe. All these statements by Western leaders showed their inability to reach a systemic solution. In addition, the grain reserves of Ukraine were not able to completely solve the food problem in Europe. Secondly, in Moscow they perfectly understood that Ukraine would definitely throw out some kind of provocation using the logistics of the “grain deal”, which would allow them to act in this theater as a good hero in the eyes of the whole world. Thirdly, Moscow was well aware of the upcoming record grain harvest. In order to prevent a collapse in the cost of grain on the domestic market, its significant surplus had to be extracted from domestic circulation to foreign ones. And so the statement of V.V. Putin on the supply of Moscow to the needy countries of the world for free up to 500 thousand tons of its grain.

Another mechanism for promoting a positive image and the Soft power of the Russian Federation is the “energy factor”. Numerous statements by Western politicians that Russia is using energy as a weapon are not without foundation. An important point is that Russia does not use its energy potential directly against Ukraine. She intensively uses her energy potential, i.e. the principle of "cheap energy" to promote one's own positive image, primarily in the eyes of the broad masses of the inhabitants of foreign states [7].

The unfolding events in the world in the real state of affairs have demonstrated how important and necessary is the constant large-scale supply of cheap energy. Without this component, not a single even the most highly developed economy is able to function normally. Undoubtedly, the modern crisis phenomena in the economies of Germany, the USA, Great Britain, and also other Western countries can serve as an example. They immediately began with the rise in energy prices. For a layman, especially in the Asian region, the events of 2022 in Sri Lanka are very memorable, where the entire crisis and the catastrophic events that followed, from the point of view of the uninitiated, began precisely with a sharp jump in energy prices.

Under these conditions, under the influence of various objective and subjective factors, Russia began to apply this mechanism in the Asian region. A government decision followed to discount discounts to friendly countries. At the same time, it is important to note that the main impetus for this action was given by the G7 countries and the European Union by their constant statements and aggressive actions against the Russian energy complex. At the same time, the Russian side presents its discount policy both to Russian society and to the societies of countries that receive cheap Russian energy resources in the most favorable color for Russian foreign policy.

Within the framework of developing trends, both in the short and medium term, the use of Soft power in Russian foreign policy will grow and modernize. Such processes of modernization and improvement will take place in the context of modern events according to the following principles and directions:

1. In the near future, the translation and promotion of Soft power in Russian foreign policy will move from the principles of reflection to the principles of creation and improvement.

2. The system of transformation and change in the principles of the implementation of Soft power will naturally entail a revision of the technologies used and the emergence of new technologies and mechanisms for Russia to use it in the foreign policy space.

3. An objective perspective for the development of foreign policy processes in the modern world in the very near future will be the formation of a new concept and system of Soft power, both in the foreign policy of Russia and other countries striving for world domination. This process can result in three main directions: the appearance of a significantly different version of "Soft power 2.0"; the emergence of a "Eurasian" or "variant" based on opposing oneself to the existing Western one; each country that creates its own global project or ideological concept will form its own concept and Soft power system under it.

4. To date, the ideological concept of Russia has actually taken shape. It is based on the principles of modern conservatism and traditionalism. His idea is based on the protection of the traditional foundations of society from the negative impact of modern liberalism.

5. Russia's global project will undoubtedly go through subsequent stages of development. Today it is in its infancy, but its actual formation is a matter of a relatively short period of time. The opened window of opportunity for him will not be permanently open. The Russian leadership is aware of this condition. Undoubtedly, it will try to create the most mentally universal project covering a significant number of regions.

It is quite natural to expect that in the near future we will witness a tough struggle between the elements and mechanisms of soft power. The confrontation between the opposing sides is

only gaining momentum. Ukraine is not the last site of the clash of geopolitical opponents. The participants in this confrontation are already carrying out painstaking work in the direction we are describing. To date, it is only determined in which direction the work is going to improve the system of soft power: either in the direction of improving the characteristics of existing elements, or in the direction of creating new components of soft power. Both the Russian side and other participants in the confrontation and countries creating their own global or regional projects.

Conclusion

For the modern political establishment and the scientific and expert community, it has become very clear that the struggle for the redivision of the world and geopolitical domination has entered a new hot phase. Old and new adversaries understand this struggle is carried out according to new rules. The new confrontation objectively rules out the possibility of a head-on collision by force between the main players. The toolkit created by political strategists in the 20th century is being used, based on non-coercive foreign policy pressure in the international arena.

As the trends in the development of Russia's foreign policy in recent years, especially in the third decade of the 21st century, show, it is perfectly understood that it is in the soft power parameter that it is most catastrophically lagging Western countries. Considering the experience of the confrontation between the USSR and the West, realizing that it is in this parameter that the main confrontation will unfold upon completion of the active combat phase, and the fact that the "Iron Curtain 2.0" already actually exists, the Russian Federation will undoubtedly strengthen its position in this aspect of foreign policy.

It is also quite natural to expect that other equally interested states will gradually join this peculiar race of technologies, methods, and tools for implementation with full force. The desire for multipolarity, and as a result, the actual design of regional projects, will definitely increase the confrontation in the Soft power component, even simply along the line of mutual negation and contradiction of global and regional projects.

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Soft power және Ресей Федерациясының сыртқы саясаты: қазіргі заманның кейбір аспектілері

Аңдатпа. Мақала Ресей Федерациясының сыртқы саясатының дамуы мен өзгеруін талдауға арналған. Ресейдің саясаты көптеген практикалық аспектілерге байланысты Украинадаевых қимылдарының басталуымен қазіргі саяси ғылымдағы ең зерттелген бағыттардың бірі болып табылады. Ол осы мемлекеттің әлемдік аренадағы перспективалық жаңа рөліне сәйкес объективті серпінді дамып, өзгеруде. Мақаланың мақсаты-таяужәне орта мерзімді перспективада әлемдік кеңістіктегі ресейлік сыртқы саясатты одан әрі іске асыруда Soft power элементтерін модернизациялау мен трансформациялаудың қолданылуын анықтау. Нәтижесінде, мақалада Ресейдің сыртқы саясатындағы негізгі тұжырымдамалық өзгерістерді және ресейлік тараптың сыртқы саяси кеңістіктегі Soft power-ді тарату мен ілгерілетудегі мүмкін модернизациялар мен жақсартулардың бағыттары туралы белгілі бір болжамдарды анықтауға тырысады. Талдау барысында авторлар әлемдік аренадағы саяси қарама-қайшылықтың негізгі қатысушылары таяу болашақта өздерінің сыртқы саясатында Soft power технологиясын белсенді дамытып, жетілдіреді деген қорытындыға келді. Объективті түрде, олар қарсы тұру әдістері мен технологияларын дамытуға жаңа серпін алады, оларды практикада үнемі қолдануды күшейтеді. Осылайша, жетекші елдер, соның ішінде Ресей де өздерінің сыртқы саяси мүдделерін қарусыз алға жылжыту форматында "қару-жарақ жарысына" қатысады.

Түйін сөздер: «Soft power», «жаһандық жоба», «идеологиялық тұжырымдама», «идеологиялық қарама-қайшылық», «көпполярлы әлем».

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Soft power и внешняя политика Российской Федерации: некоторые аспекты современности

Аннотация. Статья посвящена анализу развития и трансформациям внешней политики Российской Федерации. Политика России несомненно с началом боевых действий на Украине в силу многих практических аспектов одно из самых исследуемых направлений в современной политической науке на сегодняшний день. Она объективно динамично развивается и трансформируется в соответствии с перспективной новой ролью этого государства на мировой арене. Целью статьи является определение задействования элементов Soft power их модернизации и трансформации в дальнейшей реализации российской внешней политики в мировом пространстве в ближнесрочной и среднесрочной перспективах. В результате в статье делается попытка по определению основных концептуальных изменениях в российской внешней политике и определенные прогнозы о направленностях возможных модернизаций

и усовершенствований трансляции и продвижения Soft power российской стороной во внешнеполитическом пространстве. В ходе анализа авторы пришли к выводу, что основные участники политического противостояния на мировой арене в ближайшей перспективе будут активно развивать и совершенствовать технологию Soft power в своей внешней политике. Объективно также получают новый толчок к развитию методов и технологий по противодействию, усиливая их постоянное применение на практике. Тем самым ведущие страны в том числе и Россия вовлекаются в своеобразную «гонку вооружений» в формате не вооруженного продвижения своих внешнеполитических интересов.

Ключевые слова: «Soft power», «глобальный проект», «идейный концепт», «идеологическое противостояние», «многополярный мир».

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