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Transformation of Iran's regional policy: the influence of external factors

Abstract. *The period after the events of the Arab Spring, which began in 2011, is identified by a large number of disputes and discussions about the regional policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not only at the level of the Republic itself, but also in the international geopolitical arena. In addition, attention was also paid to the development of a strategic plan for Iran and its role in the region against the background of the fact that Iran, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, did not lose its relevance in the study of political scientists and related specialists. The purpose of this article is to research and analyze how Iran's strategic plan works and what its role is in the Middle East region since the beginning of 2011. This academic study asserts that regional policy of Iran is a unique blend of ideology and pragmatism that allows Iran to realize its objective as a nation-state in the international system. Iran's regional policy has taken a shift away from fighting the United States in order to maintain its regional position and resist the trend that threatens the resistance. The research followed content analysis methodology and document analysis was done from secondary data. The article concluded that Iran's policy has changed primarily as a result of shifts in regional and international political dynamics. Iran's international balancing laws, which aim to balance international powers against threats, reinforce these significant changes.*

Keywords: *Regional Policy, Political dynamics, Middle East, USA, Iran, Syria, Arab Spring, Geopolitics, Islam.*

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Introduction

Since 1979, Iran's revolutionary foreign policy in the Middle East portrays a regional power that is unhappy with the status quo and wants to increase its influence. Iran's international status has been virtually meaningless for centuries because of the country's declining power. The ruling class of modern Iran has transformed the nation into an international power in response to the dangers posed by this reality. Before World War II, they tried to make it easier for Iran to move between Russia and Britain. After that, they allied with Iran and the United States to balance the Soviet Union. However, Iran's tradition of alliance-building was transformed by the Islamic Revolution of 1979 into one of

“non-aligned” in the spirit of the Third World non-aligned movement.

Prior to 2011, Iran's main strategy, Balanced Action, replaced this non-alignment tradition. Since 1979, this was unprecedented behavior that is well-balanced to help keep and build autonomy [1]. This does not, however, imply that Iran has utilized an international alliance as an alternative strategy; rather, in contrast to its previous actions, Iran's balancing act aims to strengthen independence through new models of relations with world powers and strategic cooperation.

This is in response to how Iran's role and politics in the region have changed. Iran's policies gradually shifted from being revisionists to being seekers of the status quo

during the 1980s and 1990s, when they were concerned with deterring US containment policies as well as regional threats and rivals. Iran is now committed to containing, countering, and reducing threats by imposing a blockade, departing from the conventional strategy of strategic planning to combat US and regional adversary threats. With the beginning of the Arab Spring, specifically the regional campaigns against Assad in Syria, came these changes. The Iranian strategic community gained a fresh perspective on Middle Eastern developments and options in a volatile region as a result of this. At the end of 2011, Tehran entered a new dimension and a new action plan as a result of the anti-regional regulatory policy and altered priorities. Particularly in countries and regions that were allied with Iran, Tehran employed a variety of strategies to discourage its adversaries from maintaining the status quo.

Due to its singularity and specificity, Iran's political behavior continues to be a global issue. It is not only complicated, but it is also difficult to comprehend without considering it from multiple perspectives. Iran's reorientation in the international system following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, particularly in comparison to the world power USA, is noteworthy in this context. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between the US and Iran shifted from being pro-Western to being anti-Western, and they deteriorated rapidly until Khomeini's death in 1989 due to ideological factors (Wise, 2011). Iran's policy changed once more after Khomeini's death, adopting a revolutionary ideology and a pragmatic approach. The US-Iranian relationship is still marked by these shifts.

This study aims to investigate how ideology influences Iran's regional policy and relationship with the other countries, including Middle East and United States, as well as how it influences Iran's capacity to cooperate with the United States at one time and in a completely different way in the future. Iran's regional and foreign policy toward the United States changed after Khomeini, shifting from confrontation to building relationships. In the changing dynamics of local and global politics, new interpretations of religious ideologies to pursue national interests are most significant.

Research Objectives

The objectives of the research will bear to:

- To examine the impact of socio-political impact of regional policy of Iran Iran, and
- To investigate future prospective of regional policy of Iran.

Significance of the research

This study looks at how Iran's strategic actions in the Middle East changed before and after the Arab uprising in 2011. This article It discusses how and why the Arab uprisings since 2011 have altered Iran's regional policy. This study article expands on the first point by focusing on Iranian regional politics and attempting to clarify Iranian rationality outside of its domestic political context. However, this article it provides a general analysis of some internal aspects of Iran's foreign policy when necessary and appropriate.

Materials and Methods

Research Question

The research will be is focused to answer the following research questions:

- What is the impact of socio-political impact of regional policy of Iran?
- What is the future prospective of regional policy of Iran?

Research Methods

The research will follows cContent analysis methodology. Further, for the content analysis method, the approach of document analysis has been used. A methodical approach to studying or evaluating printed as well as electronic (computer-based and Internet-based) documents is known as document analysis. According to Corbin & Strauss [2], document analysis, like other research methods, requires the analysis and interpretation of data in order to discover meaning, gain insight, and construct empirical knowledge. For this research, secondary data will be has been used to for analyzeanalysis.

Literature Review

Iran's actions in the Middle East prior to 2001 were influenced by structural and geopolitical forces that restricted its regional

reach and influence. Iran came under more pressure in the 1990s as the Cold War gave way to a one-world order. However, since 9/11, this has changed in the Middle East. Geopolitically, Iran won the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the baht regime in Iraq in 2003, unlocking a lot of the region's potential. The literature generally agrees that Iran's bold regional stance and national security have benefited from the unintended consequences of US actions in the Middle East.

Iran's external position was transformed by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 from that of an island of stability under US influence to a non-aligned position that questioned the US role and interests in the Middle East. At the beginning of the revolution, the unspoken hostility that existed between the United States and Iran became a direct conflict as a result of the hostage crisis in Tehran and US sanctions against Iran. This further escalation shaped relations for decades to come. The two nations have stuck to a list of complaints and allegations that they have in common.

The United States exerted a significant amount of pressure on Iran following the revolution. Washington has attempted to contain Iran through various sanctions for nearly 40 years. Washington supported its partners' anti-Iran response on the ground, such as supporting the Iraq war effort from 1980 to 1988, while also leading international campaigns against Iran [3]. In addition, in the 1990s, the United States of America increased the size of its military presence in the region and implemented a dual containment strategy in response to threats posed by Iraq and Iran.

The political community of Iran began developing strategic priorities independently and against the pressure of the major powers under intense pressure. Prior to 1979, the US's regional priorities were had been largely reflected in Iran's strategic plan. However, "a group of people who believed in Iran's full independence" came to power during the 1979 revolution. Iran's regional involvement has decreased as the momentum of independence has reduced the range of strategic options.

Prior to the Arab uprising in 2011, Iran had played a more active role in the Middle East as a result of the prolonged and devastating

war with Iraq. Iran's blockade by Washington has always played a significant role in this recent regional decision. Iranian politicians came up with a countermeasure plan to break Washington's blockade, recognizing the regional threat and US efforts to reduce revolutionary appeal and influence. Iranian leaders in major nations have formed alliances and asserted Iran's interests regionally and globally as part of this strategy.

A more aggressive strategy to prevent Iraq's "forced war" against Iran has emerged, in addition to US containment policies in the region. There are two dimensions to Iran's deterrence. Asymmetric assets are used in the first dimension. In the case of Hezbollah, this was demonstrated. In accordance with Iran's regional strategy, Hezbollah evolved from a part-crew militia to a more regional force. The «Axis of the Resistance,» a coalition of like-minded nations and militias, unified this strategy as it spread beyond Lebanon over time.

The Middle East's power balance has changed since 2011, and this axis has grown even stronger. The resistance, according to Iran's supreme leader, aims to deter others. Through the Resistance Axis, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has repeatedly emphasized that deterrence is deterrence because Iran is after deterrence.

Since deterring US pressure as well as regional threats and adversaries is a key strategic choice, Iran's strategic decision-making has been limited and sensitive to US policy for more than 30 years. The initial goal of the Iranian response and deterrence strategies was to eliminate the threat. Iran's counterattack and deterrence, in conjunction with its reactive response, were calculated to prevent further escalation. Iran has restricted its own choices and decisions for decades because of this. However, the Arab uprising that followed 2011 ended this dichotomy.

Iran has been subjected to pressure and isolation in the Middle East since 1979, and as a result, its regional power balance has never been favorable. However, the US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq have significantly altered the balance. The United States of America increased pressure to discourage Iran in Iraq in order to mitigate the effects of

the brutal occupation. Numerous accounts indicate that Iran is on the US list of targets for Iraqi attacks. Iran's strategic decisions and actions in the region were later influenced by the mere possibility of an American invasion, despite the fact that US involvement in Afghanistan, particularly Iraq, prevented war with Iran.

Iran's regional position and strategy underwent unprecedented shifts as a result of the Arab uprising. The Arab Spring presents Tehran with both new opportunities and new threats. The Arab insurgency was portrayed by Iran as a problem with a strong connection to its policy toward the United States. As a result, while Iran hailed the termination of the American alliance and a shift in the regional balance of power, it did not praise anything else. Ayatollah Khamenei's June 2011 speech has been recognised as Iran's regional political platform since 2011. In it, he said unequivocally that Iran will only support Islamic popular revolutions and anti-American uprisings. Tehran has consistently reiterated this point [4].

The Arab revolution also prompted a power struggle that ended in the development of a third regional front led by the Muslim Brotherhood. The creation of new regional axes or fronts was perceived as an opportunity rather than a problem in Tehran. With the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, the divided regional struggle headed by Iran and Saudi Arabia and sponsored by the US gave way to a more diversified atmosphere in the region.

New environments had to be created at the expense of the US as the difficulties faced by local camps backed by the US grew. Additionally, Tehran viewed the expansion of the axis of resistance in the Middle East as a result of the triangle's shift. The Arab uprising strengthened Iran's position in the region. The region's customary behavior includes their responses, support, stereotypes, and opposition. The Iranian strategic community has maintained the same dual strategy of deterrence and response throughout the Middle East's decades-long expansion. They thought that coming up with a new strategy was unnecessary. However, Iran altered its course as a result of the Syrian Civil War.

The Syrian exception

Iran's strategy of deterrence includes its policy toward Syria, and without Syria, the implementation of deterrence would have taken a different form. One of the oldest and longest-standing alliances in the region is the Iran-Syria alliance, which was formed during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran came under regional pressure led by Iraq following the revolution. Iran was pleased to find a partner in Syria and struggled to balance Iraqi hostility. Baghdad's ideological and geopolitical positions were also challenged by Syria. The association saw Iraqi hostility as an extension of US Middle East policy, rather than the Israeli threat, with the intention of preventing Iraqi aggression. Additionally, both ideologically opposed colonialism, and the United States opposed both Syria and Iran as imperialist and colonial adversaries.

Although this alignment has changed over time, the logic of deterrence that connects Iran and Syria has remained the same. In the 1980s, Iraq posed a threat to the Iranian-Syrian alliance; however, the catastrophic fall of Iraqi forces in 1991 tempered its turmoil in the 1990s and weakened the Syrian-Iranian alliance. With the change from Hafez Assad to Bashar Assad in July 2000, the Syrian-Israeli conflict in the Golan Heights and Hezbollah's action of withdrawing Israeli forces from Lebanese territory in May 2003. Even though Israel is another focus, allies [5]. Additionally, Iran and Syria attempted to establish a deterrent force because they felt gravely threatened by the US invasion of Iraq. Syria has experienced significant vulnerability between US forces stationed on the eastern border of Iraq and western Israel, just like Tehran, which is surrounded by US forces and bases in the region.

Iran and Syria have increased their support for resistance movements inside and outside of Israel in an effort to combat both. Additionally, they put in a lot of effort to derail US plans to establish an Iraqi regional launch pad using "rapid, flexible, and effective force projection" as the foundation for «lily petals. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense at the time, envisioned the Lily Fields strategy as a permanent base that would allow more Americans to return to Iran and Syria with fewer troops.

The Iranian-Syrian alliance was able to combat the regional foe as the Syrian crisis began to escalate into a regional conflict. The Syrian-Iranian alliance was also blamed for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 and the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Iranian leaders have been astonished by the civil war in Syria in this context. The discontentment of the Syrian populace, in particular, was comparable to that of other Arab nations. Iran's concerns about Syria's stability were expressed by its first reform council [5, p.35].

A new Iranian narrative about Syria has emerged as a result of the beginning of armed opposition training campaigns and the beginning of regional and international actions against Damascus wave of resistance. Iranian politics in Syria were at a critical crossroads after President Barack Obama announced Assad's resignation in August 2011 and many Arab nations, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, severed ties with Damascus.

Iran made the decision to support the Syrian government against armed rebels and the Thakfir militant group at that time, toward the end of 2011. Iran's supreme leader made the declaration that the country would only support Islamic, popular. Tehran used its already limited options when it became clear that Iran's enemies and rivals were supporting the Syrian rebels.

The shift beyond Syria

Iran's strategic actions in Syria and the region have changed since 2011. Iran considered the regional balance of power and order to serve the United States and its allies before 2011 and rejected the status quo. This view was made stronger by the US blockade of Iran and a counter-blockade and deterrence strategy that Iran and its allies used to protect themselves from the US. Since 2011, this dynamic has undergone significant shifts. The new policy was designed to maintain and uphold the existing regional power balance, as demonstrated by Iran's support for the governments of Syria and Iraq [6].

In addition to the incident in Syria, Tehran's growing influence in the region is another powerful factor. During the first phase of the Arab Spring, Iran enjoyed a strengthened

and relatively stable position, in contrast to its rivals and enemies, who lost allies and were mired in wars and crises across the region. This change is indicated by the availability of penalties [7].

The balance of the region began to shift in Iran's favor during the initial phase of the Arab uprising. As a result, Iran stopped pursuing a strategy of bolstering its position against local rivals prior to 2011 and began doing so after that year. Iran's position in the Middle East has largely improved as a result of integration, because it has kept the local balance in his favour. Saudi Arabia's adversary hoped to exploit the Syrian rebellion and harness the wave of regional insurgencies in Iran and Syria to destabilise the region. Tehran, on the other hand, chose to retain the status quo. This marked a substantial shift in Iran's typical approach in the area from anti-order to pro-order. Iran's strategy of preserving the status quo, however temporary and unique, is unmatched in the region's history [8].

More importantly, these changes have affected Iran's strategic plans and actions. Strategies for containment and response containment have been implemented in previous policies to reduce threats. A parallel strategy was required for the consolidation phase transition. As a result, Tehran has adopted containment through engagement and/or deterrence. Tehran has transformed into a status quo nation in order to contain local threats.

Although Iran's regional actions have included blockades in the past, their nature, scope, and scale have recently increased. There are two main ways it differs from the previous case. To begin, the new containment aims to isolate various participants in the Syrian conflict. Iran has decided to blockade Syria completely (mahar-e hame-janebeh) in an effort to consolidate its position and drive out all of its rivals and foes. By moving against the axis of the resistance, the Iranians are, whether intentionally or not, complying with American demands. Therefore, "the US" is Iran's decision to support Damascus. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar's support for armed rebels in Syria has been treated similarly. It must be dissuaded through fighting, like in

Turkey, or by counterattacking, like in Saudi Arabia [9].

Second, Saudi Arabia was isolated from a single player in a number of instances by imposing a complete quarantine on Iran. Iran took steps to blockade Riyadh in order to put an end to Saudi Arabia's anti-Iranian campaigns throughout the region and beyond, particularly following its involvement with the Syrian regime in August 2011.

Iran has utilized every opportunity and strategy since then to contain Saudi Arabia. Iran has attempted to exclude Saudi Arabia from its role in Syria. With little support from Ansarala, Iran attempted to cloud Riyadh in a prolonged asymmetric war in Yemen. Iran provided Doha with a lifeline in Qatar to overcome Saudi blockades and challenge GCC dominance [10]. As Riyadh created an environment for Iran to exploit, many of them were essentially reactive. Iran responded by containing the Saudis and maintaining the current balance in the region, and Riyadh played a role in changing the status quo in all of these acts witnessed in Tehran. Iran's strategic actions and plans have generally focused on Syria, but the new containment strategy went far beyond Syria.

Results and Discussion

In order for Iran to consolidate its strength and position in the region against its rivals and enemies, a containment strategy needed to be developed. Russia and Iran's strategic partnership in Syria departs significantly from Iran's long history of revolutionary nonalignment. In terms of its foreign policy, Iran has transcended the custom of "neither East nor West" and pledged to work with non-regional powers in the Middle East. Additionally, it has made an incredible start by granting Iran the authority to militarily close its bases for use in the same manner. In point of fact, «the first experience of security and military cooperation that Iran embarked on after the revolution is Iran's military cooperation with Russia.»

The goal of Iran's new international engagement is to find a middle ground. Through the Iran-Russia partnership, Iran has tried to balance Syria and coalition forces in the region supported by the US, with the clear

goal of strengthening its regime in Syria. The Syrian crisis «can have a significant impact on shaping the future regional order in the Middle East,» in contrast to previous cooperation in Tajikistan and Afghanistan [11]. This highlights the significance of this collaboration the phase of internationalization and Iranian intervention in Syria. Before September 2015, it is said that Mr. G. Qassem Solaimani went to Moscow several times to coordinate the Russian intervention.

Iran has changed its international stance from one of nonalignment to one of balance. This was not always about forging alliances; rather, it was about bolstering Iran's independence through strategic engagement and collaboration with major powers around the world. Even though Iran and the six major powers signed the JCPOA, it was seen as favorable to the West. Tehran had to collaborate with non-Western forces to achieve equilibrium. The goal of cooperation between Iran and Russia was to stop Iran from getting closer to the western orbit. In addition, it is reasonable to assert that Iran's requirements in relation to Syria have resulted in the internationalization of Syrian policy; however, the fact that this policy was put into action as soon as the JCPOA was signed demonstrates that this value is balanced. As a result, Iran's Western orientation had to be balanced in cooperation with Russia after the JCPOA.

As a result of interference, Iran's independence and territory were restricted for two centuries, and Iran's tradition of distrust of international powers was broken by military cooperation with Russia and the JCPOA. Even though this skepticism has subsided, it still reflects Iran's new international strategy. This trend predates the JCPOA, which, in conjunction with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as president from 2005 to 2013, called for a move east «to balance the West.» However, prior to the end of the JCPOA, nothing of strategic significance occurred [12].

Iran hopes to contribute to the development of a multipolar order in the post-JCPOA balancing act by forming alliances with emerging powers in opposition to the United States of America, which is the established power. Iran has come under intense American

pressure since the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that a polarized world order has made it easier for it to maneuver. Iran achieved international equilibrium as a result of the US dual containment strategy in the 1990s and increased pressure on Tehran in the early 2000s. A regional containment strategy that supports Iran's capacity to implement regional containment includes international countervailing measures.

Iran's sociopolitical socio-political composition

The strategic and geopolitical significance of Iran places it at a crossroads in the global tug-of-war at the moment. Iran's revolutionary ideology, which dominates its security policy, is reflected in its foreign policy behavior. The Iranian political system stands out from other revolutionary systems because of its revolutionary ideology and Islamic characteristics [13]. The selection of an appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing Iranian foreign policy is restricted by Islamic ideology. The behavior of Iran's foreign policy cannot be accurately analyzed using the common rationalist and positivist approaches. Rationalist theory can to some extent explain Iran's foreign policy behavior mainly in terms of material factors in the international system, but in this case, it cannot explain the role of immaterial factors, especially ideology.

Iran's foreign policy has never taken revolutionary ideology for granted, but its intensity is decreasing as global political dynamics shift. However, Iran's foreign policy is heavily influenced by ideology. In Iran's foreign policy, the predominance of pragmatism in politics to deal with the new challenges and shifting contours of regional and international politics is evident despite the importance of the ideological factor [12, p. 41]. Security and survival issues are approached rationally and pragmatically, sometimes substituting ideologies, as in other nations. Iran's foreign policy is the result of a complicated combination of factors, some of which are rooted in identities that have existed for centuries. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, some of these are ideological factors that emerged during

the Khomeini era. There are generally three primary components to Iran's foreign policy. Nationalism, Islamism, and anti-imperialism are just a few examples [14].

Conclusion

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran's regional policies reflect a perceived threat. Iran used a counterattack to defeat the US containment strategy, and Iran's deterrence strategy emerged during the eight-year «imposed war» (1980-1988). Up until 2011, Iran's main options were these two strategies. Iran focused on counterattacks despite the fact that the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 altered the balance of power in the Middle East. However, the expanding presence of US troops in the region limited Iran's options deterrence and blockade of the area.

The Arab uprising of 2011 altered Iran's Middle East strategy. As part of a strategy to diversify regional power relations and weaken rivals and enemies, Iran accepted the insurgency as an «awakening of Islam» and allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to take over the region. Syria was a unique case. As part of its anti-Iran policy, Tehran has observed that its rivals support the armed opposition and extremist groups in Syria. Iran responded by increasing its Damascus support. To stop local avalanches from reaching Damascus, Tehran has implemented a robust containment strategy.

The United States cannot ignore Iran's geopolitical role and importance in the region, so they must accept them and increase their importance. Due to their divergent ideologies, divergent national interests, and divergent regional and global objectives, Iran and the United States are prone to clashes and conflicts. The two nations' actions could result in a direct military confrontation if they continue as they are, incurring significant political and economic costs for the nation and the world community as a whole. The Iranian people will receive the message that the United States of America is not an adversary and abides by international law if diplomatic relations between the two countries are resumed. Both nations will benefit from the outcome if a confrontation is avoided.

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Иранның аймақтық саясатының трансформациясы: сыртқы факторлардың әсері

Аңдатпа. 2011 жылы басталған «Араб көктемі» оқиғаларынан кейінгі кезең Иран Ислам Республикасының аймақтық саясаты туралы дау республика деңгейінде ғана емес, сонымен қатар халықаралық деңгейде қарастырылды. Сонымен қатар, Иранның 1979 жылғы Ислам революциясынан кейін саясаттанушылар мен ғалымдардың зерттеулерінде өзектілігін жоғалтпауы аясында Иранның стратегиялық жоспарын әзірлеуге және оның аймақтағы рөліне назар аударылды. Бұл мақаланың мақсаты – 2011 жылдың басынан бері Иранның стратегиялық жоспарының қалай жұмыс істейтінін және оның Таяу Шығыс аймағындағы рөлі қандай екенін зерттеу және талдау. Бұл академиялық зерттеу Иран Ислам Республикасының аймақтық саясаты Иранның халықаралық жүйеде ұлттық мемлекет ретіндегі мақсатын жүзеге асыруға мүмкіндік беретін идеология мен прагматизмнің бірегей қосындысы екенін алға тартады. Иранның аймақтық саясаты, авторлардың пікірінше, аймақтағы позициясын сақтап қалу және аймақтық көшбасшы рөліне ие болу үшін Америка Құрама Штаттарымен күрестен алшақтап кету. Зерттеу контент-талдау әдістемесі бойынша жүргізілді, ал құжаттарды талдау қосымша деректер негізінде жүргізілді. Мақалада “Иран саясаты ең алдымен аймақтық және халықаралық саяси динамикадағы өзгерістер нәтижесінде өзгерді” - деп қорытындыланады. Қазіргі уақытта Иранның сыртқы саясатындағы өзгерістер аймақтандыру және оларға бейімделу үрдістерімен байланысты.

Түйін сөздер: аймақтық саясат, саяси динамика, Таяу Шығыс, АҚШ, Иран, Сирия, Араб көктемі, геосаясат, ислам.

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Трансформация региональной политики Ирана: влияние внешних факторов

Аннотация. Период после событий арабской весны, взявших свое начало в 2011 году, отождествлен большим количеством споров и обсуждений о региональной политике Исламской Республики Иран не только на уровне самой республики, но также и на международной геополитической арене. Кроме того, внимание уделялось также и разработке стратегического плана Ирана и его роли в регионе на фоне того, что Иран после исламской революции 1979 года не теряет своей актуальности в исследовании политологов и смежных специалистов. Цель данной статьи заключается в исследовании и анализе того, как действует стратегический план Ирана, и какова его роль в регионе Ближнего Востока с начала 2011 года. В данном научном исследовании утверждается, что региональная политика Исламской Республики Иран представляет собой уникальное сочетание идеологии и прагматизма, которое позволяет Ирану реализовать свою цель как национальное государство в международной системе. Региональная политика Ирана, по мнению авторов, отошла от борьбы с Соединенными Штатами Америки, чтобы сохранить свои позиции в регионе и претендовать на роль регионального лидера. Исследование проводилось по методологии контент-анализа, а анализ документов проводился на основе вторичных данных. В статье сделан вывод о том, что политика Ирана изменилась прежде всего в результате сдвигов в региональной и международной политической динамике. В нынешнее время трансформация внешней политики ИРИ обусловлена диктуемыми процессами регионализации и адаптации к ним.

Ключевые слова: региональная политика, политическая динамика, Ближний Восток, США, Иран, Сирия, Арабская Весна, геополитика, ислам.

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