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Youth as a factor of political stability

Abstract. *In this article, the author studies the concept of political stability and analyzes the factors of youth that affect stability. To date, the world's population is increasing, and young people occupy the main cohort. In this regard, they are both a positive resource and a negative one. According to research, the propensity of young people to terrorist and protest activity is because the state is not able to meet the needs of young people. In particular, youth policy is understood as a system of state measures aimed at supporting and developing youth. An analysis of stability studies showed that one of the factors contributing to a decrease in stability is youth. Factors contributing to youth mobilization include youth bulge (increase in the number of young people in relation to the total population), growth in education with high unemployment, high unemployment and low levels of resources in relation to the number of young people, poverty, urbanization (youth migration to cities, an increase in the number of young people), social conditions (low motivation/family/career), low trust in political institutions, high levels of corruption, etc.*

Keywords: *Youth, youth policy, stability, political stability, «youth hillock», education, unemployment, social status.*

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Introduction

At a time when the process of globalization is deepening in the world, youth policy becomes relevant for every country because youth is an important strategic resource. According to the data, «by 2055, the world's population will reach 11 billion people, and most of them will be young people» [1].

This demographic trend indicates the presence and development of a «youth hillock», which is a factor of stability[2]. Therefore, to maintain stability, countries with a high proportion of young people need to pursue a constructive

youth policy that fully meets their needs and desires[3].

There are many fundamental studies on how the ruling circles, during the period of tectonic political changes taking place in the countries of the world, used the youth factor to achieve their goals. In particular, during the implementation of the «Arab Spring», the youth factor was identified as the main driving force in the implementation of mass protests. An analysis of foreign studies in this direction shows that young people played the role of the main «catalyst» that provoked these instabilities. As a result, this proves the need to study the factors affecting socio-political stability.

Research methods

The research uses methods of description, deduction, and induction.

Measuring political stability

There is no single precise definition of political stability. Over the past few decades, more and more studies of political stability have emerged, each of which has led to a different understanding of stability. For example, Lipset (1960) understands political stability as a stable democratic state with division and consensus between the government and the opposition, competition, the struggle for power, and change of power[4]. Morrison and Stevenson (1971) understand «political stability through the prism of violence and conflict»[5]. Alesina and the authors (1992) define political stability as a tendency to shift executive power by constitutional and unconstitutional means[6].

Hence, the definition of «stability» is ambiguous in definition and measurement. In particular, empirical studies present their understanding of stability, which creates problems with its operationalization. Therefore, the debate around this concept among researchers has been divided into two directions: the first direction considers the index of socio-political unrest («index of socio-political instability») under political stability; the second direction considers the change of government under political stability[7]. In each direction, there are changes in the state that violate stability.

Akhremenko (2009) identifies two approaches to determining political stability: static and dynamic approaches. The static approach involves quantitative indexing of the stability level, which includes several components of instability. As the author notes, the problem with the static approach is that it does not reflect the causality of destabilizations. While the dynamic approach, on the contrary, considers political stability as a process and allows us to identify the causes of destabilization, based on structural changes in the system over time[8].

Gibbs (1973) defines «political stability as mass political violence, which can be repression, armed attack (armed actions against the government), political strikes (trade union

or student protests against politicians or government representatives), murder (political killings against representatives – «servants of the people») [9]. Cloud Aike (1975) presents «a behavioral approach to understanding political stability. In its definition, political stability is understood as the retention of political power by the society within the framework of the law and is associated with the actions, words, and deeds of the political elites themselves» [10, 11].

At the same time, studies are studying the dynamics of the development of destabilization. Quantitative historical studies show that the long-term dynamics of political instability are not trivial[12]. Korotaev and the authors (Korotaev, Shishkina, Lukhmanova, 2017) in the article «The wave of global socio-political destabilization 2011-2015: a quantitative analysis» writes that after the «Arab Spring» «most indicators of socio-political destabilization - anti-government protests, riots, political strikes, terrorist acts, «partisanship» and political repression - they have increased on a global scale, that is, the «Arab Spring» provoked subsequent global instability» [13].

Turchin also studies the dynamics of stability in his research (Turchin, 2012), he analyzes the dynamics of socio-political instability in the United States from 1780 to 2010, where stability is understood as political violence: riots, lynching, and terrorism[14]. Goldstone and colleagues (2010) in the work «A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability» analyze the dynamics of destabilization to identify factors affecting political instability two years before the event. By political stability, they mean wars for independence, ethnic wars, changes in political regimes, genocides, and politicides, in total they identified more than 140 episodes in the period from 1955 to 2003[15].

It is also necessary to study studies that consider stability not as a set of parameters, but within the framework of one parameter of destabilization, in particular, such parameters as internal conflict, political crises, terrorism, coups d'etat, etc.

In particular, J. Powell, and L. Tyne in the study «Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset» stability is understood as a coup d'etat. The authors note that the analysis of

coups at the global level will make it possible to understand the cause and consequences of coups, i.e. the reason for undermining stability [16].

Based on the above definitions and analysis of the dimensions of political stability, it can be concluded that «political stability refers to changes in the political system measured by indicators of political instability, in particular political assassinations, political strikes, uprisings, government crises, purges (repression), riots, revolutions, and anti-government protests.»

The link between youth and stability

Many studies in the field of political science discuss the connection in political science prove between political stability and economic indicators, such as the level of GDP, investment climate, and inflation growth (Gupta, 1990; Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1992; Peroti, 1996; Campos, Nugent, 2000; Aisen, Viegas, 2006; Jong-A-Pin, 2008), with political and demographic indicators (Goldstone et al., 2010), with the level of corruption (Aurore, 2012), and, conversely, rapid economic growth hinders political stability and social development (Olson, 1963; Huntington, 1996.), availability of developed social capital (Putnam, 1993; Lukhmanova, 2019), institutional trust and interpersonal trust (Chloupkova et al., 2003; Trejo, 2009; Juan, Pierskalla, 2016) affect the stability of political institutions and the state [17,18,19,20,21,22,23].

In this section, we will consider the role of youth in influencing stability in the state.

In the social sciences, young people have been studied relatively recently as a factor in the stability of political regimes [24]. According to stability studies, young people were the driving force of the «Arab Spring» of 2011-2013, during which several political upheavals occurred around the world (Korotaev, Shishkina, Lukhmanova, 2017) [25]. These are young people with higher education, but unjustified expectations combined with the high demographic activity of young people (the number of young people in the region (14-25 years) is more than 30%) have become a destabilizing factor [26].

Other researchers, on the contrary, argue that young people have played an important role in many revolutions and protests throughout

history, influencing the cultural and political development of countries [27].

The researchers focus on the historical development of societies and note that the impetus for the development of the country could be an increase in the share of young people in the total population within the so-called «youth hill», for example, «the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, the rise of communist movements during the Cold War, European colonialism, the Civil War in Great Britain and the French Revolution and others» [28].

As a result, «the political activity of young people can play an important role in the transformation of the social system of the state. Socio-political activity manifests itself both through participation in elections and through public speeches (demonstrations, demonstrations, rallies, protests, etc.) as a stabilizing factor. Mass youth marches can be both constructive and destructive for the existing political system» [29].

When it comes to contemporary events in the Middle East, scientists suggest that the «youth hill» could become a key factor in mass uprisings throughout the region (Korotaev, Hodunov, Burova, Malkov, Khalturina, Zinkina, 2012) [30]. LaGraffe comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that «the appearance of a «youth hillock» in Egypt is one of the reasons for the beginning of the «Arab Spring» (LaGraffe, 2012)» [31].

Khodunov concludes that «the significant growth of youth associated with socio-economic difficulties in Iranian Kurdistan in the 1980s (according to the 1976 census, the share of youth in this period is estimated at 33.1% of the total population) became the main factor in the intensification of socio-political instability (Khodunov, 2014)» [32]. Social conflicts due to limited resources increase as the population grows and life expectancy increases. (Acemoglu, Fergusson, Johnson, 2017) [33].

Braungart (1984) studied «political violence in Sri Lanka in 1971, he concluded that the instability of the state was accompanied by an increase in the number of young people, the development of education in conditions of high unemployment» [34]. Hoffman and Jamal (2011) noted that «unemployment among the young

was a source of discontent with the regime» [35]. Another factor is urbanization, which, along with an increase in the number of young people, affects stability, since young people usually migrate from rural areas to cities. Thus, «the factors of youth surge and intensive urbanization together create a particularly powerful destabilizing effect. The number of radical young people living in cities is growing especially rapidly, and such young people are concentrated in large cities/political centers, which can lead to destabilization» [36]. At the same time, the «generation gap» is another explanation for youth demonstrations (Mead, 1970) [37].

In other words, «stability (civil war) is influenced not only by the growing proportion of young people but also by other factors, such as poverty, characterized by low financial capabilities and bureaucratic attitude of the state» [38]. «The propensity for new ideas and heterodox religions, discontent with old forms of politics, and low responsibility for family and career make it quite easy for young people to participate in social and political conflicts» [39]. «The tendency of young people to turn to terrorism and protests is associated with the inability of the state to meet the needs of young people who feel more prone to violence due to institutional boredom and «low opportunity cost» [40]. As a result, unjustified expectations of young people contribute to the emergence of social movements (Gur, 1970), which, in turn, depend on social networks (Diani, McAdam, et al., 2003; Diani, 2004) based on trusting relationships (Tilly, 2005) [41,42,43].

As for the 2011 protests in the Arab world, especially in North Africa and the Middle East (for example, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria), many researchers believe that «the revolutionary actions of young people are explained by unfulfilled expectations and disappointment of citizens regarding the existing system of governance based on corruption and violence by authoritarian governments» [44]. They believe that «the revolutionary actions of young people are caused by their unjustified expectations and disappointment in the existing system of governance based on corruption and violence by authoritarian governments». Violence, lack

of control over the activities of politicians, and corruption encouraged citizens to unite and concentrate against the tyrant's power. (Wedeen, 2015).

At the same time, studies show that governments are alarmed by the political and demographic threat posed by the «youth hill». Against this background, the state uses repressive management mechanisms to maintain stability, which is confirmed by a statistical study analyzing the relationship between youth outbreaks and state repression from 1976 to 2000 (Nordas R., Davenport Chr., 2013). In other words, the State applies certain mechanisms to deter young people and maintain stability. Meanwhile, a study of Cuban youth conducted by REND confirms that «relations between the state and youth are deteriorating as young people face increasing asceticism, limited opportunities for upward mobility and unrealized personal material, spiritual and cultural aspirations (1989). In response, an increasing number of young people are deliberately rejecting codes of conduct dictated by official doctrine and political regimes.» At the same time, the marginalization of young people can lead to economic opportunities and affect stability.

Thus, it can be seen that the main factors for mobilizing youth and reducing stability are the following:

- youth hill (the growth of the number of young people from the total population);
- the growth of education accompanied by a high unemployment rate;
- high unemployment rate/low resource ratio compared to the number of young people;
- poverty;
- urbanization (migration of young people to cities, increase in the number of young people);
- low social status (motivation/family/career);
- reduced confidence in the political system;
- extreme corruption.

It follows from this that the Governments of countries with a high proportion of young people should pursue a constructive youth policy that fully meets their needs and desires to maintain stability. This is because youth policy is a systematic and strategic provision of support for the development of young people by the state.

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З.Т. Лухманова

Ўзбекистан Республикасы Жастар агент агенттігі жанындагы жастар проблемаларын зерделеу және перспективалы кадрлар даярлау институты, Ташкент, Ўзбекистан

Жастар саяси тұрақтылық факторы ретінде

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада автор саяси тұрақтылық ұғымын зерттейді, сонымен қатар тұрақтылыққа әсер ететін жастар факторларын талдайды. Бүгінгі таңда әлемде халық саны артып келеді және негізгі когортты жастар алады. Осыған байланысты олар оң ресурс та, теріс те. Зерттеулер атап өткендей, жастардың террористік және наразылық әрекеттеріне бейімділігі мемлекеттің жастардың қажеттілігін қанағаттандыра алмайтындығына байланысты. Атап айтқанда, жастар саясаты деп жастарды қолдауға және дамытуға бағытталған мемлекеттің шаралар жүйесі түсініледі. Тұрақтылықты зерттеуді талдау

тұрақтылықтың төмендеуіне ықпал ететін факторлардың бірі жастар екенін көрсетті. Жастарды жұмылдыруға ықпал ететін факторларға мыналар жатады: жастар туберкулезі (халықтың жалпы санына қатысты жастар санының артуы), жоғары жұмыссыздық жағдайында білім берудің өсуі, жұмыссыздықтың жоғары деңгейі және жастар санына қатысты ресурстардың төмен деңгейі, кедейлік, урбанизация (жастардың қалаларға қоныс аударуы, жастар санының артуы), әлеуметтік шарттар (төмен мотивация / отбасы / мансап), саяси институттарға деген сенімнің төмендігі, сыбайлас жемқорлықтың жоғары деңгейі және т. б.

Түйін сөздер: Жастар, жастар саясаты, тұрақтылық, саяси тұрақтылық, «жастар бугоры», білім, жұмыссыздық, әлеуметтік мәртебе.

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Институт изучения проблем молодежи и подготовки перспективных кадров при Агентстве по делам молодежи Республики Узбекистан, Ташкент, Узбекистан

Молодежь как фактор политической стабильности

Аннотация. В данной статье автор изучает понятие как политическая стабильность, а также анализирует факторы молодежи влияющие на стабильностью. На сегодняшний день население в мире увеличивается, и основную когорту занимают молодые люди. В этой связи, они являются, как и позитивным ресурсом, так и негативным. Как отмечает исследования, склонность молодежи к террористической и протестной активности связано с тем, что государство не способно удовлетворить потребность молодежи. В частности, под молодежной политикой понимается система мер государства направленного на поддержание и развитие молодежи. Анализ исследований стабильности показало, что одним из факторов, способствующих к снижению стабильности является молодежь. К факторам, способствующим мобилизации молодежи, относятся: молодежный бугор (увеличение числа молодых людей по отношению к общей численности населения), рост образования при высокой безработице, высокий уровень безработицы и низкий уровень ресурсов по отношению к числу молодых людей, бедность, урбанизация (миграция молодежи в города, увеличение числа молодых людей), социальные условия (низкая мотивация/семья/карьера), низкое доверие к политическим институтам, высокий уровень коррупции и т.д.

Ключевые слова: Молодежь, молодежная политика, стабильность, политическая стабильность, «молодежный бугор», образование, безработица, социальный статус.

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